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ENHANCING EMPLOYEE
PRODUCTIVITY AFTER
ELECTROMATION AND DU PONT
American businesses face increased competition in the global
market and actively seek new ways to boost productivity.' Over the
past few decades, trends in academic research and literature have
shifted from emphasizing employee control to promoting employee
cooperation as the primary means of enhancing productivity.2 Firms
continue to experiment with work organization, compensation sys-
1. See, e.g., Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary In-
novations in Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UN-
IONS AND ECONOMIC COMP=ETITVENESS 173,191 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos
eds., 1992).
2. "Over the past decade, there has been a major shift in management philoso-
phy and practice in many firms and other organizations from the old 'Theory X'
military, chain of command model to 'Theory Y,' involving participative manage-
ment and the use of employee involvement (EI) systems." John W. Kendrick, Policy
Implications of the Slowdown in U.S. Productivity Growth, in PRODUcTIvrrY
GROWTH AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 75,102 (Stanley
W. Black ed., 1989). Cf WILLIAM G. OuCHI, THEORY Z: How AMERICAN BusI-
NESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE (1981) (advocating adoption of Japa-
nese participative management practices as a means to rejuvenate American
business).
McAdams and Hawk summarized the shift:
In a traditional, hierarchical organization, the primary role of employees is to
comply with direction. The newer approach realizes that we expect and, in fact,
need our employees to be active participants in improving business perform-
ane ..... These two mind-sets have very different implications for the way we
think about people. The traditional mind-set stresses control issues, particularly
cost control. It regards people as a cost of doing business - and costs are to be
minimized. The emerging mind-set suggests that we view people as assets -
and assets should be developed. Thus encouraging our employees' creativity
and capabilities can be a strategic method for improving our competitive
position.
Washington University Open Scholarship
256 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:255
tems, and labor relations in order to increase productivity and prof-
itability.3 Two devices have emerged and now proliferate:
employee-participation plans (EPPs)4 and performance-reward
plans (PRPs).5
Businesses design EPPs primarily to promote employee-manage-
ment communication, tap worker creativity, and enhance productiv-
ity and morale, most commonly through the establishment of
committees consisting of managers and employees to assist in work-
place decision-making.6 PRPs, on the other hand, encourage the
same behavior through a reward mechanism that links awards with
JERRY L. McADAms & ELiZABETH J. HAWK, CAPITALIZING ON HUMAN ASSETS 9
(1992).
3. Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at 191; Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison,
Unions, Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECO-
NOMIC CoMPE rV rEss, supra note 1, at 247, 247-48.
4. EPPs include such plans denoted as employee involvement plans, work teams,
quality control circles (QCs), joint labor-management cooperative committees, joint
production teams, team systems, autonomous work groups, voluntary cooperative
efforts, strategic participation, job enrichment, and quality of work life (QWL) pro-
grams. Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at 176.
In general, EPPs involve superiors who share decision-making with their subordi-
nates. John A. Wagner III & Richard S. Gooding, Effects of Societal Trends on
Participation Research, 32 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 241, 241 (1987).
Approximately 80% of the Fortune 1000 firms use some sort of EPP. NLRB Rul-
ing Could Ultimately Force Corporations to Restructure Employee Involvement and
Quality Circle Programs, PR NEwswiRE, Dec. 21,1992. EPPs are considered to be a
solution to the cost, quality, and productivity problems plaguing American industry,
and help companies compete in the global market. Id.
5. PRPs represent one of the most promising and popular compensation innova-
tions in recent decades. See Randolph M. Hale, The New Industrial Relations in a
Global Economy, 37 LAB. LJ. 539, 542 (1986). Gainsharing, profitsharing, and
other productivity gainsharing techniques are popular academic topics. Id. Com-
pensation theorists widely advocate PRPs. See, e.g., EDWARD E. LAWLER III,
STRATEGIC PAY: ALIGNING ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES AND PAY SYSTEMS
(1990); JAY R. SCHUSTER, THE NEW PAY: LINKING EMPLOYEE AND ORGANIZA.
TIONAL PERFORMANCE (1992).
PRPs have no standard definition, but they generally include: performance as-
sessment at any particular level of the firm; inclusion of non-management employ-
ees; non-competitive, non-deferred rewards; and the use of clear, pre-announced
performance-payout links, as opposed to managerial discretion. McADAMS &
HAWK, supra note 2, at 15.
The most prominent PRP forms are gainsharing and non-deferred profitsharing
plans. PRPs may also link compensation to measures other than productivity or
financial performance, such as quality, safety, output/volume, cost reduction, attend-
ance, sales/referrals, or project milestones. MCADAMS & HAWK, supra note 2, at 50.
6. See, e.g., Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at 173 (stating "many managers, labor
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individual or work group performance.7
Many EPPs and PRPs, despite their diversity and lack of standard
design, successfully boost employee productivity.8 In a series of re-
cent cases, however, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
renewed the controversy over the legality of EPPs and PRPs.9 In
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Board held that PRPs
designed and implemented by an employee committee at a union
plant constitute an unfair labor practice." In Electromation, Inc.,12
leaders, and government officials have come to believe that tapping worker knowl-
edge and energy is the key to overcoming our problems of competitiveness.").
Employers may have darker motivations for installing EPPs as well, such as pre-
empting union organizing campaigns. See Stephen I. Schlossberg & Miriam B. Rein-
hart, Electromation and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation in the U.S.,
43 LAB. L.J. 608, 619-20 (1992) (observing "employers... speak the language of
labor-management cooperation but concentrate real energy and commitment on the
ugly principle of union-busting"); Bennet D. Zurofsky, Everything Old Is New
Again: Company Unions in the Era of Employee Involvement Programs, 8 LAB.
LAW. 381, 386 (1992) (stating "employee participation programs are nothing more
than unilaterally created management vehicles for dealing with the issue of collec-
tive bargaining"). See also Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at 181; John Schmidman &
Kimberlee Keller, Employee Participation Plans as Section 8(a)(2) Violations, 35
LAB. L.J. 772, 772 (1984).
7. See generally McAD~ms & HAwK, supra note 2. Gainsharing plans, for in-
stance, specify a formula for splitting gains resulting from employee efforts. Dale
Belman, Unions, The Quality of Labor Relations, and Firm Performance, in UNIONS
AND ECONOMIC COMPETrvENEss, supra note 1, at 41, 75 n.27.
8. See infra notes 43-51 (discussing the effectiveness of EPPs and PRPs). See
also MCADAMS & HAwK, supra note 2, at 10 (finding PRPs that used operational
payout measures, such as productivity, provided a typical 200% return on payout to
employers).
But see Wagner III & Gooding, supra note 4, at 241, 258 (citing studies yielding
differing conclusions on EPP participation-productivity link, and concluding that re-
suits depend on methodology employed).
9. The business and legal media anxiously awaited the Electromation decision.
See, e.g., John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Quality Circles, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 6,
1991, at 3; Gene Koretz, Worker Involvement: It Sounds Like a Good Idea, But...,
Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 1991, at 18; John S. McClenahen & William H. Miller, NLRB
Takes Measure of Quality Circles, INDUS. WK., Nov. 4, 1991, at 84; Jeffrey C. Mc-
Guinness, Blunting America's Competitive Edge; Will Labor-Management Coopera-
tion be Ruled Illegal?, INDUS. WK., Oct. 21, 1991, at 63; Randall Samborn, Case
Holds Key to U.S. Competitiveness; NLRB to Rule on Legality of Labor-Manage-
ment Committees, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1; Kirk Victor, Labor v. Management
in 'Son of Sham', NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1992, at 965.
10. 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637 (May 28, 1993) [hereinafter
du Pont].
11. See infra notes 195-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the du
Pont case.
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the NLRB ruled that under certain circumstances EPPs constitute
labor organizations unfairly dominated by non-union employers.13
The Electromation and du Pont rulings have important implica-
tions for EPPs and PRPs.14 While joint union-employer established
EPPs and PRPs are legal,15 traditionally non-unionized industries,
12. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th Cir. Dec. 28,
1992) [hereinafter Electromation].
13. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Electro-
mation case. The National Labor Relations Act governs employee-employer rela-
tionships. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
14. PRPs are often designed and implemented similarly to EPPs via joint em-
ployee-management design teams. MCADAMS & HAwK, supra note 2, at 38.
15. See Donna Sockell, The Legality of Employee Participation Programs in Un-
ionized Firms, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 541, 542 (1984) (stating that "despite
union objections, these programs seem to be thriving").
While a supportive union is unlikely to bring an NLRA challenge against an EPP,
a nonsupportive union may well contest the plan. Sockell argued that unionized
employers may violate § 8(a)(5) if they bypass the bargaining agent or abrogate
their duty to bargain collectively. Id. at 543. Section 8(a)(5) prohibits employers
from bypassing recognized bargaining representatives in the discussion of topics sub-ject to mandatory bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1989 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 736 (Dec. 22, 1989), the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found precisely this violation. Id. at *73. Despite
union objections, du Pont formed a "Design Team" to address and correct working
conditions. The team proposed, inter alia, a PRP ("Accomplishment Awards Sug-
gestion System"). Id. "By exhorting the Team to propose solutions to workplace
problems, and by adopting them on the bargaining table, [du Pont] created and fos-
tered [a labor organization] whose purpose and functions competed with those of
the Union." Id. The AIJ also indicated in dictum that Team consideration of a
proposed "participative management" program (a hybrid EPP/PRP) would violate
§ 8(a)(5). du Pont, 1989 N.L.R.B. LEXIS at *73. See also Jafco, a Div. of Modern
Merchandising, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1377, 1379 (1987) (holding employer's unilateral
implementation of "suggestion committees" illegally bypassed exclusive bargaining
representative).
Unions can similarly block PRPs. In Camvac Int'l Inc., 388 N.L.R.B. 816, 818
(1988), the NLRB found that the employer's implementation of a profitsharing PRP
shortly after a union's demand for recognition violated § 8(a)(1) because it con-
ferred a benefit without a persuasive business reason, and "failed to show that it
would have announced implementation of the plan when it did had there been no
union activity." Id.
Unions, however, are often the initial proponents of EPPs. Eaton & Voos, supra
note 1, at 173-74. Evidence also indicates that EPPs can flourish in union environ-
ments. Stephen I. Schlossberg & Steven M. Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future
of Labor-Management Cooperation, 3 LAB. LAW. 11, 11-12, 14-17 (1987) (recounting
positive GM-UAW and Ford-UAW experiences); see also William E. Fulmer & John
J. Coleman, Jr., Do Quality-of-Work-Life Programs Violate Section 8(a)(2)?, 35 LAB.
L.J. 675, 682 (1984) (finding unions working successfully with management in QWL
programs).
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such as those in the service sector, now risk violating the NLRA
when implementing EPPs and PRPs.' 6 Many managers may errone-
ously assume the NLRA does not apply to non-union environ-
ments. 7 Thus, devices designed to boost productivity require a
fresh evaluation. As one commentator noted, "[m]anagement and
workers need clearly delineated standards within which to function
in worker participation groups if this technique is to be effectively
implemented and utilized."18
This Note examines labor policy in its historical and contempo-
rary context to discern the interests of management and employees,
and to determine whether EPPs and PRPs require governmental
protection. In the interest of productivity, this Note asserts that fed-
eral labor law should not view EPPs and PRPs as employer-domi-
nated labor organizations under the NLRA. Part I examines the
productivity crisis and the evolution of EPPs and PRPs. Part II dis-
cusses the purpose and history of the NLRA. Part III considers the
interpretations of the NLRA and its impact on participation plans.
Part IV analyzes policy options, and Part V concludes that EPPs and
PRPs should not be subject to the restrictions imposed by the
NLRA.
I. THE PRODUCTIVITY CRISIS AND THE EVOLUTION
OF TIM PLANS
A. The Productivity Crisis
Productivity growth is essential to the national economy.1 9 On a
It is unlikely, however, that unorganized employees will have the impetus to pro-
pose EPPs or PRPs. Particularly in non-unionized service sector firms, management
takes the initiative. See Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1736, 1738 n.11 (1985)
[hereinafter Participatory Management].
16. The post-Electromation decision in Research Federal Credit Union, 310
N.L.R.B. No. 13, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 15 (Jan. 8, 1993), which invalidated an em-
ployer's EPP, augers poorly for the non-unionized service sector. See infra notes
187-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Research Federal Credit Union
case.
17. The NLRA does not distinguish between manufacturing and service employ-
ers. See NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988). Non-union service firms are as
vulnerable to charges of unfair labor practices as unionized manufacturing firms.
18. Michael S. Beaver, Are Worker Participation Plans "Labor Organizations"
Within the Meaning of Section 2(5)?: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 36 LAB.
LJ. 226, 237 (1985).
19. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECrATIONS: U.S. ECONOMIC
1994]
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macroeconomic level, national productivity growth raises living
standards2" and maintains national economic power.2 During the
1950s and 1960s, productivity grew an average of 2.8% annually;
since the 1970s, however, it has slowed to 1.2%.22 The "productivity
crisis"' is most apparent in the service sector.24 Economists remain
PoLicY IN THE 1990s 17 (1990). "Productivity growth is the single most important
factor affecting [the United States'] economic well-being." Id.
20. Id. at 10. Raising productivity is the only means by which to sustain long-
term growth in living standards. Id. Krugman noted that this causal relationship is
illustrated by comparing real consumption per capita with productivity growth in the
United States: both are currently four times greater than in 1900. KRUGMAN, supra
note 19, at 10.
Other economists agree. "Perhaps the most fundamental implication of the de-
cline in productivity growth relates to our own standard of living. Increased produc-
tivity makes possible national economic growth and an improved individual
standard of living." Howard M. Leichter, National Productivity: A Comparative Per-
spective, in PRODuCrvrI-y AND PUBLIC POLIcY 49 (Marc Holzer & Stuart S. Nagel
eds., 1984). See also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL, PRODUCTIVITY AND AMERICAN
LEADERSHIP: THE LONG VIEV 24 (1989) ("[fln the long run, productivity growth
can make an enormous contribution to living standards, and [ ] there is no substitute
for productivity growth in this respect"); see generally MARTIN M. BAILY & ALOK
K. CHAKRABARTI, INNOVATION AND THE PRODucrIVrrY CRISIS 1-12 (1988).
21. KRUGMAN, supra note 19, at 12. Krugman stated:
Shifts in national power are, in the end, dominated by productivity. Since
World War II, productivity growth in Britain has averaged about 1.5 percent a
year, in Japan it has averaged 7 percent. Britain won the war, and Japan lost;
yet Britain has become a third-rank power, while Japan is on the verge of be-
coming a first-rank one.
Id. See also Leichter, supra note 20, at 64-65 (comparing contemporary U.S. pro-
ductivity problems with those of Britain in the early 20th century); Lester Thurow,
The Moral Equivalent of Defeat, 42 FOREIGN POL'Y 114, 124 (1981) (inferring that
U.S. economic problems, including slowed productivity growth, are the "moral
equivalent of defeat. The United States has been defeated economically.").
22. KRUGMAN, supra note 19, at 12. See also BAILY & CHAKRABARTI, supra
note 20, at 1-2 (using output per hour of labor as a productivity measure, found
productivity to grow 3.3% annually in 1948-65, but only 1.4% in 1965-85).
Since the publication of Krugman's book, productivity growth for 1992 rose to a
2.7% annual rate, the largest growth in 20 years. See, e.g., America the Super-Fit,
THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1993, at 69 (stating productivity grew 3% in the service
sector). Accord Michael Prowse, Productivity in U.S. Increased 2.7% Last Year, FIN.
TIrMs, Feb. 5, 1993, at 5.
23. See generally BAILY & CHAKRABARTI, supra note 20. Cf. BAUMOL ET AL.,
supra note 20, at 81-82. Baumol stated:
The available data leave us with no clear and uniform productivity growth
trends for the U.S. economy .... [but] [e]ven if the United States is suffering no
slowdown relative to its past, other economies may be doing even better than
that, and the competitiveness of [the U.S.] economy may thereby indeed be
threatened.
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undecided on the cause of the slowed growth,' but generally agree
that the solution requires increasing worker capital, improving edu-
cation, and reducing consumption.26 The solution will require the
attention of three actors: the federal government, labor, and
management.27
The first actor, the federal government, benefits from higher pro-
ductivity via increased tax revenues and lower trade deficits. While
the government recognizes that the crisis exists, its principal re-
sponse to date has been to form committees and issue reports.' No
Id.
The financial press routinely refers to U.S. productivity woes as a "crisis." See,
e.g., Crashes Big and Small, FIN. TuNfs, Oct. 19, 1992, at 18; Karen DeWitt, Educa-
tion Lobby Getting Crowded, N.Y. TnEs, Jan. 6, 1991, at 38; Gene Koretz, No Ser-
vice Sector Pain, No Productivity Gain, Bus. WK., Jan. 21, 1991, at 20; The Rewards
of Failure, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1992, at 18.
24. Koretz, supra note 23, at 20 (stating that the "U.S. productivity crisis is cen-
tered in the service sector;," manufacturing sector productivity rose 44% during the
1980s, while service sector productivity rose only 1.4%).
25. See generally BAILY & CHAKRABARTI, supra note 20, at 13-45 (reviewing
various explanations; the authors conclude that as to labor, neither deterioration in
work effort nor labor quality explains "weak productivity performance").
One scholar summarized that:
These... are the major explanations for the productivity slump: (1) excessive,
counterproductive government regulations; (2) changes in the work force; (3)
increased service orientation of the U.S. economy; (4) decline in the work ethic;
(5) worker resistance to innovative equipment and practices; (6) poor manage-
ment; (7) inadequate investment; (8) inadequate resources devoted to R&D; (9)
government subsidization of "sunset" industries and lack of encouragement of
"sunrise" industries; and (10) economic cycles. Although there are a few econ-
omists who are willing to cite one factor as the villain, most contend that a
combination of these have contributed to our productivity problem.
Leichter, supra note 20, at 53-54 (emphasis added).
26. BAILY & CHAKRABARTI, supra note 20, at 15. See generally id. at 13-45;
BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 20, at 251-82.
27. See JoIm T. DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYsTEMs 17, 94 (1958). In
this classic treatise, Dunlop identifies these actors and infers they share an underly-
ing consensus that delineates and legitimizes their roles; this shared ideology stabi-
lizes the system. Id at 383. Conversely, any lack of shared consensus leads to
change:
An industrial-relations system implies an inner unity and consistency, and a sig-
nificant change in one facet of the context or the ideology may be expected to
displace an old equilibrium... and to create new positions within the system
and new rules.
Id. at 388.
28. Congress created the National Commission on Productivity in 1971. Pub. L.
No. 92-210, § 4, 85 Stat. 753 (1971) (repealed 1975). This led to the establishment of
1994]
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cohesive productivity policy has yet emerged.29
The second actor, labor, stands to benefit from higher productiv-
the National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life (National Center)
in 1975. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2471 (1988). "Despite chronic inadequacy of funds, the
National Center through its various incarnations managed to develop and dissemi-
nate information on labor-management cooperation as part of its broader program
to improve private sector productivity." Ronald J. St. Cyr, Worker Participation and
Quality of Working Life at the Plant Level American Experience and the Federal
Role, 35 LAB. LJ. 539, 542 (1984). President Carter established the National Pro-
ductivity Council in 1978 to supersede the National Center. Exec. Order No. 12,089,
3 C.F.R. 246 (1978).
President Reagan established the National Productivity Advisory Committee in
1981 to provide advice on increasing national productivity. Exec. Order No. 12,332,
3 C.F.R. 198 (1982). Reagan also created the White House Conference on Produc-
tivity in 1982. Pub. L. No. 97-367, 96 Stat. 1761 (1982). See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON INDUS. CoMPErrrIvENEss, 2 GLOBAL COMPETITION: TH NEW REALrrY 12-16,
139-60 (1985); REPORT OF THE WHIEr HousE CONFERENCE ON PRODUCriVITY
(1984). In summary:
New forms of labor-management cooperation must be created .... If the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board and the courts agree that such changes are pro-
hibited by the Act, some changes in the basic labor laws may well be necessary
that these innovations are not in violation of the [NLRA] ... Employee incen-
tives must be strengthened so as to reward the efforts of individual employees
and to highlight the linkages between pay and performance... Work skills must
be improved...
Id.
Congress instituted the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in 1987 to
award companies that increased employee-employer communications in the pursuit
of quality. 15 U.S.C. § 3711a (1988).
A more proactive approach surfaced when Congress passed the Labor-Manage-
ment Cooperation Act of 1978, which directed the Federal Mediation & Conciliation
Service to grant funds to support joint labor-management initiatives. 29 U.S.C.
§ 173 (1988). Joy K. Reynolds, A Perspective on the Electromation Case from the
U.S. Department of Labor, 43 LAB. L.. 397, 399 (1992).
The Department of Labor (DOL), which has long advocated joint efforts on the
part of workers and employers, also commissioned studies. See Schlossberg & Fet-
ter, supra note 15, at 13 (describing DOL efforts). DOL eschews taking an activist
strategy because "a consensus on legislation or a change in statutory interpretation
[can] not be dictated by the government, but need[s] to grow out of agreement by
the parties." Reynolds, supra at 397.
Robert Reich, the new Secretary of Labor under the Clinton Administration, out-
lined a four-point agenda to address improving the quality of U.S. jobs. Labor De-
partment, Reich Outlines Four-Point Plan to Improve Quality of U.S. Jobs, DAILY
RFP. ExEc., Jan. 8, 1993, at 5. The fourth point is to encourage "high performance,"
"family-friendly" work organizations. Id. "Reich also stressed the importance of
worker participation in a joint effort to improve productivity and competitiveness
and to make workplaces safer .... [N]o group is better able to spot efficiency and
quality improvement than workers who are right there on the front line." Id.
29. Leichter, supra note 20, at 63. "[D]espite all the reports, media attention,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/8
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ity through higher wages and living standards. The extent to which
it does so remains contingent upon its ability to bargain with man-
agement. The collective bargaining provisions of the NLRA pro-
vide organized employees with a potent weapon.30 Non-organized
employees must bargain with management on an individual basis.
For the third actor, management, improving productivity is one
means of increasing profits. Even with technological innovation,
employers aim to make workers more productive.3' An employer
can accomplish this through involving employees and communicat-
ing with them, either through union or non-union conduits. For a
non-union firm, however, encouraging union activity runs counter to
traditional American managerial philosophy; unions substantially
reduce profits. 32 Without a union, however, the employer may be
and national agonizing, no administration has yet proposed a productivity policy."
Id.
30. NLRA § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protections, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all such activities to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment...
(emphasis added). Thus, the NLRA provides a right to collectively bargain and re-
quires employers to deal exclusively with the bargaining representative. For an anal-
ysis of the resulting "Exclusivity Doctrine," see Sockell, supra note 15, at 551.
31. See St. Cyr, supra note 28.
The persistent slowdown in the rate of productivity growth starting in the mid-
1960s, management's uncertainty about new technology and how to handle it,
the rising demands from consumers for better product quality to offset infla-
tionary price rises, and international competition also impelled management to
look at how it produced and where it could improve.
Id. at 541.
32. Studies show that unionized firms within certain industrial sectors earn lower
rates of profit than non-unionized firms. See John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch,
Union Effects on Productivity, Profits & Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J.
LAB. ECON. 72, 95 (1989) (finding that "evidence points unambiguously to lower
profitability under unionism;" the authors conclude that "reductions in profitability
seem likely to result from a combination of union wage increases and rather small
(and possibly negative) union effects of productivity"); Belman, supra note 7, at 62;
1994]
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left without a known mechanism with which to interact with its most
important asset: its employees.33 The need for both a communica-
tion device and productivity gains led to the adoption of EPPs and
pR~s. 34
B. Conceptual Foundations of EPPs and PRPs
Employers implement EPPs and PRPs to increase profitability
through improved worker productivity.3" For instance, employees
Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?,
in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC CoMPE VENEss, supra note 1, at 161. See generally
BARRY T. HIRSCH & JoHN T. ADDISON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 208-15
(1986).
Management is also concerned with maximizing stockholder wealth in conjunction
with profitability. Analysis of unanticipated changes in stock prices can also be
viewed as measuring unionization effects on profitability. One study shows that
unionization depresses stock prices. Richard S. Ruback & Martin B. Zimmerman,
Unionization and Profitability: Evidence from the Capital Market, 92 J. POL. ECON.
1134, 1155-56 (1984) (showing, inter alia, that during union organizing campaigns,
stock prices drop an average of almost 4%).
For a summary and criticism of traditional economic analysis of labor unions, see
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the
Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1992).
33. In anticipation of the Electromation decision, Prof. Morris wrote:
[S]omething important is now needed to create and sustain a feeling of mutual
trust and respect between employees and their company. A company needs a
believable mechanism with which to conduct a meaningful dialog with its em-
ployees. But because it became fashionable in recent years for employers to
operate in a union-free environment, many formerly unionized companies in
America are now discovering.., that they threw out the baby with the bath....
The business community's agonized plea to the Labor Board in Electromation
[to condone EPP committees] may in reality be a Freudian cry for help.
Charles J. Morris, National Labor Policy: Worker Participation and the Role of the
NLRB, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 4, 1992, at E2. Zurofsky argues that EPPs are a
means by which management can enjoy all the benefits of collective bargaining with-
out having a powerful bargaining partner. Zurofsky, supra note 6, at 387.
Eaton and Voos found that EPPs were more successful in union environments
because of the institutionalized communication devices that unions offer. Eaton &
Voose, supra note 1, at 175. Union workers have greater job security, and are thus
more likely to speak up without fear of management retaliation. A union's "collec-
tive voice" also allows workers to directly influence the design and implementation
of EPPs. Id. at 175. Further, "[u]nion workplaces possess - and nonunion work-
places lack - institutions for serious productivity bargaining." Id. at 191.
34. For a brief history of EPPs and PRPs, see Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at
180-81. See also George Strauss & Eliezer Rosenstein, Worker Participation: A Crit-
ical View, 9 INDus. REL. 197, 200-04 (1970) (tracing historical roots of EPPs).
35. McAdams and Hawk found that of 15 potential reasons for implementing
PRPs, "improving business performance" was the most prevalent. MCADAMS &
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assigned to repetitive tasks become alienated and particularly diffi-
cult to motivate.36 The conceptual foundation of EPPs is that in-
creasing employee motivation heightens productivity. This model
assumes that the primary motivation to work is self-gratification, not
merely compensation,37 and that employees become motivated if
they participate, are involved, or have "ownership" in their tasks.
Thus, involving employees strengthens morale, makes them more
productive, increases job satisfaction, and generates profit for the
firm.38
The PRP model is conceptually similar to the EPP, but differs be-
cause it assumes reward substantially motivates employees. 39 If em-
ployees have a direct financial stake in company performance, they
will be more motivated to be productive on the company's behalf.40
Thus, PRPs typically link compensation to either a productivity or
financial-performance measure. 41 PRPs, unlike EPPs, provide di-
rect monetary rewards to employees for their contributions toward
improving productivity. 42
HAWK, supra note 2, at 30. "Apparently, PRPs are valued as business strategies
with the expectation that they will contribute to business results." Id.
36. BARBARA GARSON, ALL THE LIVELONG DAY at x-xi (1975). Garson
observed:
Many assembly-line workers deliberately slow their pace from time to time and
watch the pieces pile up. Sometimes this is for revenge against the company
that "treats us like machines," "uses us like tools." More often it's just for a
break, a chance to talk, kid around, take a drink of water. But the most com-
mon motive is one that I hadn't expected.... [T]he most dramatic thing I found
was quite the opposite of nonco-operation [sic]. People passionately want to
work.
Id.
37. For an overview of employee motivation theories, see GREGORY B. NORTH-
CRAFT & MARGARET A. NEALE, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: A MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGE 132-75 (1990).
38. See Fulmer & Coleman, supra note 15, at 675-76 (citing QWL definitions
and goals). See generally H. Peter Dachler & Bernhard Wilpert, Conceptual Dimen-
sions and Boundaries of Participation in Organizations: A Critical Evaluation, 23
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1, 8-9 (1978) (reviewing literature studying linkage between morale
and productivity); Richard E. Walton, Work Innovations in the U.S., HARV. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1979, at 88.
39. See generally NORTHCRAFT & NEALE, supra note 37.
40. See, e.g., NORTHCRAFT & NEALE, supra note 37 (couching this concept in
language such as "aligning the incentives of employees with the company.").
41. McADAMs & HAWK, supra note 2, at 55.
42. See generally BRIAN GRAHAM-MOoRE & TIMOTHY L. Ross, GAINSHARING:
PLANS FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (1990).
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C. Effectiveness of EPPs and PRPs
Studies show that EPPs generally boost productivity.43 Specific
results depend on the organizational culture of the firm.' When
studies find no EPP productivity gains, methodological problems in
the study may exist.45 PRPs are also effective. The recent Consor-
tium for Alternative Reward Strategies study46 indicates that PRPs
positively impact business performance.4' The study found that a
task force or design team, often a joint employee-management com-
mittee, develops the PRP.48 Plans designed by a task force yield
better results than those mandated by management.49 In other
words, the EPP-style task force component of PRPs enhances pro-
ductivity under PRPs. Other studies indicate that among PRPs,
gainsharing plans positively impact productivity more than profit-
sharing plans.5 0 Thus, the studies indicate that to improve produc-
43. See, e.g., Harry C. Katz et al., Industrial Relations Performance, Economic
Performance, and QWL Programs: An Interplant Analysis, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 3, 3-17 (1983) (finding that EPPs and PRPs improve economic performance of
unionized firms); Richard D. Rosenberg & Eliezer Rosenstein, Participation and
Productivity: An Empirical Study, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 355, 367 (1980)
(finding one EPP to successfully improve productivity); Schlossberg & Fetter, supra
note 15, at 14 n.7 (1986) (citing study by Office of Economic Research, New York
Stock Exchange, People and Productivity: A Challenge to Corporate America, Nov.
1982, at 24, 40).
44. GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
HIRARCHY 228 (1992) (asserting theory that work group strategies that flounder do
so because management fails to make credible commitments to group autonomy).
45. Wagner III & Gooding, supra note 4, at 241, 258 (citing studies yielding dif-
fering conclusions on participation-productivity link, and concluding that results de-
pend on methodology employed).
46. The Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies Research (CARS) study
is reported in McADAMS & HAwK, supra note 2. The CARS database includes
extensive information on 432 PRPs. Id. at 17.
47. McADAMs & HAwV', supra note 2, at 80. The most pronounced effect of a
PRP on an organization is increased communication. Id. Of all plans, 59% of the
survey participants reported that management is either very satisfied or satisfied
with their PRP. Id. at 78. The survey did not measure employee satisfaction. Id.
48. McADAMs & HAwC, supra note 2, at 38. Eighty percent of the plans sur-
veyed used task force/design teams, while twenty percent were management man-
dated. One-third of the plans that used joint employee-management task forces had
their members chosen by management. Id.
49. MCADAMS & HAwx, supra note 2, at 38. There is no statistically significant
difference in plan results, however, between joint employee-management commit-
tees and management-only committees. Id.
50. Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at 176-79. In analyzing General Accounting
Office data, Eaton and Voos found that profitsharing is more prevalent in nonunion-
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tivity, PRPs should tie compensation to a productivity measure, and
involve employees and management in designing plans and setting
baselines. This course of action, however, by a non-unionized firm
constitutes an unfair labor practice under Electromation and du
Pont." These NLRB decisions stand as barriers to employee pro-
ductivity improvement.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE NLRA
Productivity did not concern NLRA sponsor Senator Robert F.
Wagner in 1935. Instead, minimizing "industrial strife, 52 and "eco-
nomic warfare"53 were paramount. The industrial relations land-
scape of the 1930s resembled a battleground 4 The Wagner Act
sought to promote bargaining equity between employees and em-
ployers and reduce union recognition disputes.5 5 Increasing the bar-
gaining power of workers through collective bargaining provided
the means to accomplish these goals.56
Senator Wagner's bill targeted businesses that created employer-
ized settings, while gainsharing is equally prevalent in both unionized and nonunion-
ized firms. Id. at 180. Eaton and Voos stated:
Gainsharing tends to be preferred by unions over profitsharing partially be-
cause it allows more worker control over the costs included in the bonus formu-
lae and the resulting payout when productivity rises. Profits in contrast are
often viewed as subject to too much manipulation by management accounting
practices.
Id. at 184. Further, "[tihere is little evidence that profit-sharing... is particularly
effective in motivating employees to greater performance." Id. at 189.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours instituted a widely-publicized "incentive pay" (profit-
sharing) program in 1987, and rescinded it because it failed in 1992. See MILLER,
supra note 44, at 126-27 (discussing the history and analysis of the du Pont plan).
51. See infra notes 173-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases hold-
ing that management-implemented plans constitute an unfair labor practice.
52. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF = NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs AcT, 1935, at 2300,
2300 (1959) [hereinafter 2 NLRB] (stating primary objective is to promote industrial
peace).
53. See 78 CONG. REc. 4229 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIoNS Acr, 1935, at 22, 24 (1959) (article by Sen.
Wagner) [hereinafter 1 NLRB].
54. See generally JOHN A. Fossutn, LABOR RELATIONS 29-59 (1979).
55. See 2 NLRB, supra note 52, at 2300-03.
56. Section 1(b) of the NLRA provides:
The denial of some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead
to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
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dominated "company unions" to circumvent the earlier National In-
dustrial Recovery Act's collective bargaining provisions." When an
employer organized its employees, it created a "company union"58
which it could effectively control if allowed to "sit on both sides of
the bargaining table."59 Prior to the passage of the NLRA, com-
pany unions proliferated.60 In the NLRA, Congress outlawed com-
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the
efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce...
The inequality of bargaining power. .. tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earn-
ers in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries....
NLRA § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 151(b) (1988).
57. See 2 NLRB, supra note 52, at 2321,2333-35 (statement of Sen. Wagner); 79
CONG. Rnc. 7565, 7570 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), id. at 2321, 2324 (stating
that "contrary to the argument that the company union has the virtue of insuring
industrial peace, we know that this open entry of employers into the field of active
organization of workers promotes strife and discord.").
But see Senator Wagner's earlier comments, 1 NLRB, supra note 53, at 23 ("The
company union has improved personal relations, group welfare activities, discipline,
and other matters... But... [w]ithout wider areas of cooperation among employ-
ees, there can be no protection against the nibbling tactics of the unfair employer").
58. Sen. Wagner defined "company union" as an:
employer-dominated union, generally initiated by the employer, which arbitrar-
ily restricts employee cooperation to a single employer unit and which habitu-
ally allows workers to deal with their employer only through representatives
chosen from among his employees.
1 NLRB, supra note 53, at 22-23. Sen. Wagner referred to a 1933 study of mining
and manufacturing firms showing that 9.3% of workers were unionized, 45% were
company unionized, and 45.7% were nonunionized. Id.
Rep. Boland described "company-dominated unions" as:
•.. one which is lacking in independence, and which owes a dual obligation to
employers and employees. It is an agent which possesses two masters. It at-
tempts to sell the labor of its employee members to the employer member, and
at the same time it receives compensation from the employer. It acts through
representatives who are in the employ of the company, who are subject to dis-
charge and discipline by the management at any time, who purport to represent
employees and receive at the same time compensation from the employer for
their activities presumably in the employee's behalf. To require an employee or
one seeking employment to join such a union is to nullify the rights of self-
organization and to make a mockery of collective bargaining.
2 NLRB, supra note 52, at 2430, 2439.
59. See NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir. 1954) (citing Ameri-
can Enka Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir. 1941)).
60. Labor Pains in Indiana, D'rnorr NEws, Aug. 30, 1992, at Dl. "Company
unions were a fact of industrial life in the New Deal 1930s; employers resisting in-
dependent trade unions created internal groups that, at their peak, accounted for an
estimated 40-60% of all union membership." Id.
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pany unions by passing sections 2(5)61 and 8(a)(2),62 which prohibit
employer influence over broadly defined "labor organizations." 63
Employee free choice was the ultimate goal of the NLRA.6
The NLRA encouraged unionization and collective bargaining ac-
tivities through adversarial communications as a means to empower
employees.61 While the NLRA did not intend to outlaw all interac-
tion between employees and employers,66 it nonetheless forces em-
ployees to choose between an outside labor organization and no
representation at all because it forbids employees to participate in
management decision-making through cooperative entities.6 7
After passage of the NLRA, company unions disappeared and in-
dependent unions thrived.' By 1947, however, Congress thought
unions had grown too strong and collective bargaining provided too
much economic power over employers.69 The Taft-Hartley Act
61. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988); see infra note 81 and accompanying
text for the NLRA definition of a "labor organization."
62. NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988); see infra note 128 and accom-
panying text for the full text of § 158(a)(2).
63. See infra notes 80-217 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NLRA
and employee participation plans.
64. Schmidman & Keller, supra note 6, at 778 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157
(1970)).
65. See NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
66. Section 8(a)(2) also provides that "an employer shall not be prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time
or pay." See infra note 128 and accompanying text for the full text of § 8(a)(2).
The bill which I am introducing today forbids any employer to foster or partici-
pate in or influence any organization which deals with problems that should be
covered by a genuine labor union. At the same time it does not prevent em-
ployers from forming or assisting associations which exist to promote the health
or general welfare of workers, to provide group insurance, or for other similar
purposes. Employer-controlled organizations should be allowed to serve their
proper function of supplementing trade unionism, but they should not be allowed
to supplant or destroy it.
1 NLRB, supra note 53, at 16 (statement of Sen. Wagner) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 80-217 and accompanying text for an analysis of major Supreme
Court cases revealing that the Court applies § 8(a)(2) broadly and enforces a strict
separation between management and labor.
67. See Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Rela-
tions: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2022 (1987).
68. See FossuM, supra note 54.
69. The findings and policy section of the Taft-Hartley Act amended § 1 of the
NLRA to include:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor orga-
nizations, their officers, and members have the intent or necessary effect of bur-
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sought to restore equilibrium by regulating union activity.70 The
1959 Landrum-Griffin Act sought to protect rights of individuals by
regulating internal union activities.71
In interpreting the NLRA, the Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nizes the adversarial model.72 Several federal courts of appeal chal-
lenged the adversarial model in cases such as NLRB v. Streamway
dening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such
commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through con-
certed activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such
commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the
assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encour-
aging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negoti-
ating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1992).
70. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947). The House version of the Hartley Bill contained a new § 8(d)(3) which elim-
inated as an unfair labor practice:
(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and
discussing with it matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours
of employment, and other working conditions, if the Board has not certified or
the employer has not recognized a representative as their representative under
§ 9.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st. Sess. 26 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ace, 1947, at 158,183 (1948). The
section failed to become part of the final bill.
71. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin) 73
Stat. 519 (1959). Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act provides union members with a
Bill of Rights. Id. at secs. 101-05. Title V imposes a fiduciary duty on union officials
to employee members. Id. at sec. 501.
72. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 680 (1980) (stating NLRA
was "intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that
prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry"); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960) ("[t]he parties ... proceed from con-
trary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-interest"); Empo-
rium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1957) (noting
that national labor policy was designed to "minimiz[e] industrial strife" by encourag-
ing collective bargaining); Packard Motor Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 494 (1947)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing decision of Court finding foremen were employ-
ees under NLRA because it would unite management and labor against sharehold-
ers, rather than keep management and workers "separate factions in warring
camps").
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Division of Scott & Fetzer,7 which adopted what one commentator
refers to as the "enlightened" approach to modem industrial rela-
tions.74 The Electromation decision, however, indicates that the
NLRB is still reluctant to use a cooperative interpretation of the
NLRA because it is inconsistent with the Act's legislative intent.75
Given the combative nature of management and labor in the
1930s, it is understandable that an adversarial model of labor rela-
tions evolved.76 Most did not foresee a future of employee-manage-
ment cooperation in a global economy and the resulting benefit to
both sides.77 Commentators question whether an adversarial model
still applies, and assert that a cooperative model is more appropri-
ate.78 Thus, commentators criticize the literal interpretation of sec-
73. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); see infra notes 101-04, 122-25 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Streamway.
74. Martin J. Klaper, An 'Enlightened View' of the Employee Committees Under
the Taft-Hartley Act, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 474, 475 (1983).
75. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 996 n.24 (1992). See infra notes 211-
17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practical implications of
Electromation.
76. The adversarial model assumes:
There exists an inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees;
that this conflict leads to hostility; that employers wish to subvert the interest of
their employees; that no informed employee would align himself with his em-
ployer; and that any organization of employees in which management plays a
part is thus necessarily a fraud and contrary to the employees' best interests.
Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE
LJ. 510, 515 (1973) [hereinafter New Standards].
77. Labor Pains in Indiana, supra note 60. See also David H. Brody, Special
Project, The Future of Labor-Management Cooperative Efforts Under Section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VMAD. L. REv. 545, 566 (1988).
Brody stated:
The only cooperation envisioned by the drafters of the NLRA was cooperation
among labor itself. Cooperation between management and labor would be ac-
ceptable only at a later stage of employee organization development when em-
ployee organizations would be independent and strong enough to choose freely
between cooperation and contention.
Id. at 573. See also Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 15, at 17 (stating "[t]hus, after
years of adversarial relations, many employers and unions.., have decided to aban-
don traditional confrontational attitudes to try working together to increase produc-
tivity and quality for the company and improve the quality of work life for the
employees.").
78. See, e.g., Clarke, sapra note 67, at 2038-49. But see Thomas C. Kohler, Mod-
els of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L.
REV. 499, 550 (1986) (arguing that cooperative models undermine NLRA ideals of
self-association and private ordering); Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial
System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the National
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tions 2(5) and 8(a)(2) as too inflexible for current economic realities
and a less hostile industrial relations climate.79
III. THE NLRA AND EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION PLANS
The operation of an EPP or PRP may constitute an unfair labor
practice if the plan falls within the NLRA's definition of a "labor
organization" and the employer dominates or assists the plan.
Where the employer merely assists or supports an employee group,
courts will issue a cease and desist order against management.
When domination occurs, however, an order disestablishing the or-
ganization is appropriate.80
A. Labor Organizations
The NLRA defines a "labor organization" as:
[A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee rep-
resentation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.8
Congress' language including "any organization of any kind" nec-
essarily anticipates broad coverage.' Thus, labor organizations in-
clude more than just "unions." Determining whether a plan falls
within the statutory definition of a labor organization requires com-
pletion of three analytical tests: subject matter (i.e., is the commit-
Labor Relations Act, 96 H.Aiv. L. REv. 1662, 1673-80 (1983) (same) [hereinafter
Collective Bargaining].
79. E.g., Clarke, supra note 67, at 2022; Charles B. Craver, The NLRA at Fifty:
From Youthful Exuberance to Middle-Aged Complacency, 36 LAB. L.J. 604, 605
(1985); Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 15, at 38-39. "[I]t is difficult to justify re-
stricting representation to a form that was designed for industrial workers, in an
economy where three of four jobs are nonindustrial." Clarke, supra note 67, at
2045.
80. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1944);
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 250 (1939)
(stating "[D]isestablishment of a bargaining unit previously dominated by the em-
ployer may be the only effective way of wiping the slate clean and affording the
employees an opportunity to start afresh in organizing for the adjustments of their
relations with the employer"); NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 542-
43 n.5 (6th Cir. 1984).
81. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
82. See 2 NLRB, supra note 52, at 2300, 2306 (using intentionally broad lan-
guage to ensure protection under § 8).
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tee discussing section 2(5) topics?); structure (i.e., are employees
participating in a representative capacity?); and function (i.e., are
employees "dealing with" the employer? Does the committee make
only recommendations to management, or has management dele-
gated authority to make decisions?)., 3 If all three tests are met,
then the committee is a labor organization, although the decisions
do not always reflect a thorough consideration of the structure test.
1. Subject Matter Test
Under the subject matter test, the inquiry is whether the plan ex-
ists to address "grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours
of employment, or conditions of work."'  Discussion of any one of
these individual topics, typical of collective bargaining negotiations,
satisfies this threshold test.85 "Grievances" 6 and "conditions of
work"87 are the broadest categories.
83. Commentators generally agree that these three tests, or slight variations
therein, are applicable in determining whether a committee constitutes a "labor or-
ganization" under § 2(5). See Beaver, supra note 18, at 228 n.6; Raymond L.
Hogler, Employee Involvement Programs and NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.: The De-
veloping Interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), 35 LAB. L.J. 21, 24 (1984); Charles C. Jack-
son, An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly Unorganized Shop: A Legal
Basis for Sanctioning Joint Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Em-
ployee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 809, 813-14 (1977); Barbara A. Lee, Col-
lective Bargaining and Employee Participation: An Anomalous Interpretation of the
NLRA, 38 LAB. L.J. 206, 211 (1987); Barry A. Macey, Does Employer Implementa-
tion of Employee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act?, 49 IND. L.J. 516, 521 (1974); Kent F. Murrmann, The Scanlon Plan
Joint Committee and Section 8(a)(2), 31 LABOR LJ. 299, 301-03 (1980); Participatory
Management, supra note 15, at 1744; Sockell, supra note 15, at 547.
See generally W.J. Dunn, Annotation, What is a "Labor Organization" Within the
Provisions of Federal Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2) Making it Unfair Labor Practice
for Employer to Interfere with Labor Organization, 51 A.L.R.2d 1276 (1957).
84. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
85. UARCO, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 55, 75 (1987) (stating "it is well settled that the
phrasing of the statutory definition is in the disjunctive. Accordingly, 'dealing with'
an employer concerning one (or more) of the matters enumerated" satisfies the
test).
86. See NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807, 810 (3d Cir.
1967) (holding that a committee which discussed only grievances met subject matter
test); NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706,707-08 (3d Cir. 1946) (holding
that a committee designed to discuss and make recommendations on production
problems became a labor organization when it also discussed pay, hours, profitshar-
ing, scheduling, and benefits).
87. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1972)
(citing evidence that employee committee discussed sanitary conditions, ventilation,
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EPPs routinely discuss "conditions of work" when considering
means of improving productivity."8 PRP design or reassessment
teams necessarily discuss similar "conditions of work" as well as
wages, compensation, or "benefits."89 Thus, EPPs and PRPs fall
squarely within the subject matter test for labor organizations under
section 2(5).
2. Structure Test
Labor organization status also requires that employees participate
in a representative, rather than an individual, capacity.90 In deter-
mining the representational character of employee involvement,
and fringe benefits as factors considered in determining labor organization status);
UARCO, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 55, 60, 74-76 (1987) (finding discussion of, inter alia,
seniority policy and parking lot were "conditions of employment"); Ona Corp., 285
N.L.R.B. 400, 402, 405-06 (1987) (holding that discussion of breaktimes, vacation
time, telephone usage, shift preferences, and safety apparel related to conditions of
work).
88. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of EPPs.
89. See supra note 5 and accompanying text for a discussion of PRPs. The
NLRB construes § 2(5) "wages" to encompass not only hourly remuneration but
other compensation and benefits as well. See, e.g., Postal Service, 302 N.L.R.B. 767,
776 (1991).
90. Section 2(5) requires that "employees" participate. Section 2(3) states:
The term "employee" shall include any employee and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise,
... or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)(1988). Supervisors and confidential or managerial
personnel are not statutory employees. Section 152(11) states:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of
the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, as-
sign reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connec-
tion with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1988).
Managerial employees present definitional problems. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva
Univ., 444 U.S 672, 686 (1980) (finding faculty members to be managerial employees
not covered by Act); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267,289 (1974) (same). See
generally David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective
Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990); David M. Rabban,
Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1775 (1989).
By emphasizing participative decision-making, "[m]any of the most promising ex-
periments in labor-management cooperation deliberately set out to blur distinctions
between manager and worker." Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 15, at 21. See also
Lee, supra note 83, at 206; Walton, supra note 38, at 88.
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four factors are considered: "the function of the group; the form of
the plan under which the group exists; the employer's intent in
forming the group; and the employees' perception of the group.'
In general, courts consider these factors in context, outside the pro-
scriptions of per se applications.92
Under the group function prong of the structure test, the function
of the group may indicate its representational capacity. Representa-
tional capacity has been found when the group presents employee
views and makes recommendations to management,93 presents
other employees' grievances, 94 or even decides what issues should
be submitted to all employees for a vote.95 Nonrepresentational
functions have been found when a group merely provides employee
feedback to management or disseminates management information
to employees. 96
The group form prong of the structure test examines the composi-
tion, selection, and organization of the group. 7 For instance, the
absence of formal components such as a constitution, bylaws, or
elected officers has been held to be immaterial to finding organiza-
tional status.98
91. Beaver, supra note 18, at 230.
92. Id. at 233.
93. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1989 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 736, at *44-45 (1989)
(finding by ALJ that Design Team whose members identified workplace problems
and devised solutions in form of proposals to management inferred representational
capacity); Ferguson-Lander Box Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1615, 1620 (1965) (holding com-
mittee recommendations regarding vacation policy infers representation).
94. NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807, 810 (7th Cir.
1962) (finding employee committee whose members presented grievances as repre-
sentatives of other employees was labor organization); Hammond Organ Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 997, 1004 (1964) (holding consideration of other grievances constitutes
representation).
95. Geauga Plastics Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 486,491 (holding employee plant commit-
tee that decided which issues should be submitted to employees was unlawfully
dominated), enforced, 404 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 944
(1969).
96. Fiber Materials, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 933, 941 (1977) (finding employer's dis-
cussion and explanation of fringe benefit policy with selected employees, not involv-
ing negotiation or airing of grievances, was not "representational"). But see Ace
Mfg. Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1030 (1978) (holding that employee feedback concern-
ing working conditions lead to reasonable inference that such communications
would be conducive to a representative discussion that constitutes "dealing").
97. Beaver, supra note 18, at 231.
98. NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v.
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Under the employer intent prong of the structure test, the inquiry
is whether the employer attempted to establish an employee com-
mittee as a means to thwart a union organizing drive. If so, the
NLRB and the courts routinely and summarily conclude that the
committee is representational in nature.99 An employer's knowl-
edge regarding union organizational activities is thus relevant in de-
termining the representational capacity of the committee
supposedly formed to deter union activity.1°°
The final factor considered as part of the structure test is em-
ployee perception. In NLRB v. Streamway Division of Scott &
Fetzer,1' 1 the Sixth Circuit found that the employees did not con-
sider the committee in question to represent anyone.1" This lack of
employee perception of representational capacity was a substantial
factor in reversing the NLRB's finding of labor organization sta-
tus."°3 Few courts include this factor in analysis of a committee's
Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Pace-
maker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 1958).
99. Lawson Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 463, 472 (1983) (finding that employer's "sales
assistant committee" formed in response to unionization drive was a labor organiza-
tion), enforced, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985); Classic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 667
F.2d 205, 208 (1st Cir. 1981) (foregoing labor organization analysis entirely in light
of representational nature of "shop committee" and ample evidence of anti-union
animus).
100. E.g., Hasa Chem., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 903, 909 (1978). Cf. NLRB v.
Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 1982) (considering as a
factor that the employee committee was established after one unsuccessful unioniza-
tion attempt and many months prior to a second attempt as evidence of lack of anti-
union animus in finding no labor organization status); Fiber Materials, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 933, 941 (1977) (same).
101. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
102. Streamway, 691 F.2d at 295 (indicating that there was "no evidence that
anyone viewed the committee as anything more than a communicative device").
103. Id. at 295. The other factors followed the traditional group function, group
form, and employer intent analysis. The court cited a continuous rotation system of
committee members, inhibiting representation capacity, and lack of anti-union ani-
mus in addition to employee perception in determining that the structure test was
not met. Id. at 295-96. The court, however, ignored the subject matter test. It
skirted the functional test's "dealing with" requirement by noting that the Cabot
Carbon decision "did not indicate the limitation, if any, upon the meaning of 'deal-
ing' under the statute. Because the Supreme Court has not spoken further on the
issue, the question of how much interaction is necessary before dealing is found is
unresolved." Id. at 292. Instead, the court thought it more appropriate to "consider
whether the employer's behavior fosters employee free expression and choice as the
Act requires." Id. at 293. In so doing, it applied criteria pertinent to the domination
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/8
ENHANCING EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY
structure.'04
In general, the function of the EPP or PRP committee is for par-
ticipating employees to make recommendations to management." 5
Committee members are usually either selected by management or
they volunteer."° Employees arguably participate not for their own
self-aggrandizement, but to represent other employees' views. Thus,
regardless of any employer intent to foil union activity or employee
perception considerations, the functional and representational fac-
tors of most EPPs and PRPs would pass "structural" muster.
3. Function Test
The function test considers (1) whether employees have in fact
been "dealing with" the employer over matters which are normally
subject to collective bargaining and (2) the amount of power that
group wields. In the seminal case of NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. ,107
the Supreme Court held that employee committees existing, at least
in part, to deal with employers concerning grievances were labor
organizations within the meaning of section 2(5).1o8 Cabot Carbon
held that Congress did not intend the "dealing with" language of
section 2(5) to be synonymous with "bargaining with," and thus the
former included a broader scope of topics than those typically ad-
dressed under formal collective bargaining. °9 However, this does
not prevent employers and employees from discussing "matters of
mutual interest concerning the employment relationship" in the ab-
sence of a labor organization." °
issue directly to the determination of the committee's labor organization status. See
also infra notes 123, 170 and accompanying text for a discussion of Streamway.
104. Beaver, supra note 18, at 233. The NLRB explicitly rejected the employee
perception test in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637, at *3
n.7 (citing Electra Food Mach., 279 N.L.R.B. 279, 280 (1986)).
105. See discussion supra part I.B.
106. MCADAMS & HAWK, supra note 2, at 38-39.
107. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
108. Id. at 212-14. During World War II, the Cabot Carbon Company was en-
couraged by the federal government's War Labor Board to establish an employee
committee at its manufacturing plants to discuss, among other topics, grievances.
After the war ended, the employee committees continued. The International Chem-
ical Workers filed unfair labor practice charges when they were unable to organize
Cabot Carbon's employees. Id at 205-07.
109. Id. at 211-12.
110. Id. at 218.
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If the group exercises power by making recommendations to man-
agement, it is considered a labor organization because such action
resembles the function of a labor union, even absent negotiation
with the employer."' Employee group recommendations as to dis-
ciplinary policy,"12 employee benefits,"13 working conditions,114 or
employee grievances"' confer section 2(5) labor organization sta-
tus. Whether management acts on the recommendations may also
be relevant to the distinction between employee authority to make
changes and mere employee feedback.
16
The NLRB created two exceptions to the literal reading of section
2(5). Even if the subject matter and representational structure crite-
ria are met, the post-Cabot Carbon cases hold that the group does
not constitute a labor organization if it functionally makes decisions
based on management-delegated authority." 7 Thus, a labor organi-
zation does not exist when an employee-management committee ad-
judicates, but does not initiate, employee grievances," 8 or when the
111. Id. at 214.
112. American Tara Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1231 (1979).
113. Sea Life, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 982, 984-85 (1969).
114. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1989 N.L.R.B. LEXIS at *49 (citing Alta
Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. 485 (1976)(holding by AJ that discussion of the "quality
of cafeteria food, inequitable treatment of clerical employees, a restroom for non-
smokers; a revised identification system for entering parking area; and the distribu-
tion of chemical pamphlets to all laboratory technicians" fell within the ambit of
§ 2(5) topics)); Ferguson-Lander Box Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1615, 1620 (1985).
115. NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding
that committee discussing grievances with management constituted labor organiza-
tion); Hasa Chem., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 903, 909 (1978) (holding that employee com-
mittee acted as employees' advocate for grievances); but see NLRB v. Thompson
Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that employee
committee that presented employee grievances "dealt with" management despite no
evidence of making recommendations; "express recommendation is not essential to
'dealing', if discussion between [employer] and [committee] was designed to remedy
grievances.").
116. Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that em-
ployee committee "instrumental in obtaining improvements for all employees" satis-
fies functional test); NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84 (7th Cir.) (reasoning
that since management acted upon committee's recommendations, the "dealing
with" requirement was satisfied), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). See also Sunnen
Products, Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 826, 827 (1971) (same); Hammond Organ Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 997, 1004 (1964) (same). But see supra note 96.
117. Beaver, supra note 18, at 234.
118. Mercy Medical Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B 1108 (1977) (holding that a griev-
ance committee was not a labor organization; fact that the committee made a em-
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group assumes "management functions and responsibilities." 119 In
addition, meetings in which management merely explains a new pol-
icy are not considered labor organizations. 120 Further, committees
that do not represent employees as a group do not constitute labor
organizations.
21
As employee participation plans proliferated, some appellate
courts attempted to re-interpret section 2(5) to accommodate the
plans. The Sixth Circuit, for instance, ruled in NLRB v. Streamway
Division of Scott & Fetzer,"2 that in-plant representation commit-
tees designed to assess employee attitudes regarding working condi-
tions for the company's "self-enlightenment" did not "deal with"
management.123 In its controversial decision, the court held that not
ployment policy recommendation on at least one occasion was de minimis); Spark's
Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in relevant part sub nom. NLRB v.
Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a joint employee-
management committee of two managers and one employee having power to resolve
(but not initiate) employee grievances was not a "labor organization" because it
acted in an adjudicative, rather than a representative, capacity), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 906 (1981). Cf. American Tara Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1241-42 (1978) (hold-
ing that, but for other activity "dealing with" the employer in recommending new
disciplinary policy, an adjudicatory disciplinary body would not be a § 2(5) labor
organization).
119. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234-35 (1977). The management
at a General Foods plant organized all employees into production teams. Since all
employees participated in the program, there was no representational characteristic
making it a labor organization. Id.
120. Fiber Materials, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 933, 941 (1976) (holding that a meeting
called by management to explain a new fringe benefit plan was not a "labor organi-
zation;" a "discussion" did not constitute "dealing with" in this instance).
121. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234 (1977) (finding that a semi-
autonomous work team delegated with extensive managerial tasks that did not "deal
with" the employer as representatives on a group basis was not a "labor organiza-
tion"). The Board noted that "[if] such a set of circumstances should give rise to the
existence of a labor organization, no employer could ever have a staff conference
without bringing forth a labor organization in its midst." Id. at 1234.
122. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
123. Id. at 294. An absence of anti-union animus, lack of employee perception
that the committee represented employee interests, and a rotation of committee
members (indicating that recommendations were made on behalf of individual com-
mittee members rather than on behalf of all employees) led the court to its determi-
nation. Id. at 294-95.
Several commentators find the Streamway decision irreconcilable with Cabot Car-
bon. See Beaver, supra note 18, at 236 (stating that the Streamway court relies on
employer noninterference and employee satisfaction in determining § 2(5) status,
rather than as factors in the § 8(a)(2) inquiry); Hogler, supra note 83, at 27; Klaper,
supra note 74, at 481.
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all communication between management and employees concerning
employment policy violates the NLRA.2 Communication alone
between a committee and management does not accord labor organ-
ization status.1'
Most EPPs make recommendations regarding work conditions to
management, and management intends to act upon them. PRP de-
sign teams make recommendations regarding award formulas and
performance baselines for management's approval. As such, they
"deal with" management. Thus, most EPPs and PRPs satisfy the
function test.
In sum, most EPPs and PRPs meet the requirements of the sub-
ject matter, structure, and function tests. 26 Therefore, EPPs and
PRPs fall within the broad, literal definition of "labor organization"
under section 2(5).127
B. Employer Domination
If a court finds that the committee in question constitutes a "labor
organization," the issue becomes whether the employer dominates,
interferes with, assists, or supports the committee. The NLRA
states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to domi-
nate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it:
Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and pub-
lished by the Board pursuant to section 6 [29 U.S.C. § 156], an
employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to
confer with him during working hours without loss of time or
pay...
Section 8(a)(2) thus prohibits both employer domination of a labor
organization and the less invasive interference or assistance of such
a labor organization by an employer. Ostensibly, section 8(a)(2)
124. Streamway, 691 F.2d at 292.
125. Id. at 294.
126. E.g., Memphis Truck & Trailer, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 900, 911-12 (1987) (find-
ing "Employer Action Committee," similar to a quality circle, a labor organization).
127. Murrmann, supra note 83, at 301-02 (stating that "[t]he courts have refused
to further specify the intent of [§ 2(5)], and so the statutory language applies as
broadly as it is written."); Sockell, supra note 15, at 549. See also Electromation, 309
N.L.R.B. at 1008 (Raudabaugh, concurring) (stating that the judicial construction of
the statute is broad).
128. NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
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protects, among other things, employees' collective bargaining
rights. 129
1. Objective Factor Tests
The NLRB and some courts have developed three objective tests
to determine whether an employer dominates a labor organiza-
tion.'3 ° The first test examines a series of objective factors. The
employer "dominates" the labor organization if a sufficient number
of objective factors are found.' 3' Potential domination, not actual
domination, is the threshold.'32 This body of per se indicia 133 in-
cludes the following actions by an employer: creating a labor organ-
ization,' 34 aiding its formation, 35 providing financial assistance, 36
129. Zurofsky, supra note 6, at 384. Collective bargaining rights are delineated
in NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
130. See Lee, supra note 83, at 216.
131. NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807, 810 (7th Cir.
1962) (stating that "the question is not whether each individual fact is a violation,
but whether the facts taken together" infer domination); Brody, supra note 77, at
566; Lee, supra note 83, at 216.
132. Early on, the Supreme Court stated:
In applying the statutory test of independence it is immaterial that the plan had
in fact not engendered, or indeed had obviated, serious labor disputes in the
past, or that any company interference in the administration of the plan had
been incidental rather than fundamental and with good motives.
NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939).
133. See NLRB v. Link-Belt, 311 U.S. 584 (1941) (holding that § 8(a)(2) viola-
tions are actually determined under a per se rule rather than from looking at the
"totality of the circumstances"). See also New Standards, supra note 76, at 511-12.
In New Standards, the author noted:
Any employer support of a labor organization is illegal beyond a certain critical
level, regardless of the character of the challenged organization, the intent of
the employer, or the will of the employees. Under this per se rule, virtually the
only question ever litigated is whether the challenged actions are sufficient to
constitute the illegal quantum of support.
Id.
134. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 270 (1938)
(holding that creation of a company union violated § 8(a)(2)).
135. In re Home, 61 N.L.R.B. 742, 752 (1945) (holding that the drafting of a
charter and bylaws that started a union constituted an unfair labor practice).
136. See, e.g., Camvac Int'l, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 816, 847 (1988) (citing facts that
(1) employees were paid for attendance at meetings, and (2) personnel director re-
corded committee minutes and produced photocopies at no cost, as support for find-
ing employer domination); Comet Corp., 261 N.L.R.B. 1414, 1447 (1982) (holding
that paying employees for meeting on company property and time, along with com-
pany's provision of clerical assistance, were factors indicating domination). See gen-
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allowing the use of company facilities," 7 and aiding a particular
union. 38
The second test examines management's paternal relationship
with the labor organization.13 9 Creation of an organization by man-
agement does not constitute domination; 4° the employer dominates
the organization only when other factors are present, such as man-
agement control in areas of structure and membership.' 4'
erally P.A. Agabin, Annotation, What Constitutes "Financial or Other Support"
Within § 8(a)(2) [29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)] Making Such Support of a Union an Unfair
Labor Practice, 10 A.L.R.3d 861, 867-71, 876-913 (1966) (discussing which forms of
support to labor unions constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8(a)(2)).
137. Several cases held that allowing the use of company facilities or services,
including legal counsel, office space, secretarial services, and equipment, to one
union but not to another constitutes unlawful support. See, e.g., Dennison Mfg. Co.,
168 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1015-16 (1967) (providing office facilities constitutes unlawful
support); Newman-Green, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1073-79 (1966) (holding em-
ployer provision of secretarial help is illegal support); Watkins Furniture Co., 160
N.L.R.B. 188,193 (1966) (holding mere promise to provide meeting place was illegal
support); Nutone, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1170-71 (1955) (finding employer provi-
sion of copying machine illegal support); Shell Oil Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 835, 847, 853
(1937) (holding employer provision of telephone usage illegal support).
138. NLRB v. Daylight Grocery Co., 345 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that
an employer's anti-union campaign against one union, resulting in the formation of a
company union, was an unfair labor practice).
139. Lee, supra note 83, at 216.
140. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1955)
(finding that no labor organization existed where two committees formed by man-
agement used input from employees regarding structure and function).
141. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 1972)
(holding that an employer dominated a committee by meeting only at management
convenience, on its premises, and with management present, as well as by control-
ling composition of committee); NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84-85 (7th
Cir.) (holding that employer dominated committee in which management performed
everything necessary for it to function except for the attendance of employees), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Utrad Corp. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 520,523 (7th Cir. 1971)
(relying on, inter alia, employer formation, financial assistance, and supervisor par-
ticipation in finding domination); Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880, 883 (7th
Cir. 1958) (finding domination when employer presided over meetings and deter-
mined the number of employee representatives, their manner of selection, and meet-
ing times); NLRB v. Sharples Chem., Inc., 209 F.2d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 1954)
(considering employer's ability to remove an employee representative from the
committee by transferring him to a different department as one factor indicating
domination); Camvac, 288 N.L.R.B. at 847 (citing fact that management controlled a
number of employee representatives as one factor indicating employer domination);
UARCO, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 55, 75 (1987) (listing evidence that employer controlled
and participated in election of employee committee members and committee meet-
ings, and had "no operative existence save for the sufferance" of employer as facts
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The third test involves timing. This test scrutinizes the time lapse
between committee formation and a union campaign. 42 The test's
use remains most appropriate when evidence suggests that the com-
pany is attempting to thwart union organization. 43
Under a traditional objective factor analysis, EPPs rarely escape
dominated status. While employees may propose EPPs, manage-
ment must participate for the EPP to function. Similarly, PRPs re-
quire management's agreement to share gains with employees based
on some formula. EPP and PRP design often requires hiring profes-
sional consultants because it is beyond the expertise of most em-
ployees and management. 44 Extensive management involvement
remains essential. Because few EPPs or PRPs would survive absent
tacit support of the employer, they are necessarily "dominated"
under the objective factor tests.
2. Subjective Factor Tests
In a separate line of cases, various federal courts of appeal favor
using subjective tests to accommodate cooperative labor-manage-
supporting domination); Homemaker Shops, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 441, 442 (1982)
(finding employer domination when factors indicate labor organization "exists es-
sentially at will of the employer"); American Tara Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1242
(1979) (holding that employer dominated the employee committee by dictating pow-
ers and responsibilities and providing financial support); G.Q. Sec. Parachutes, Inc.,
242 N.L.R.B. 508,513 (1979) (finding that employer dominated a committee, formed
six weeks before a union election, by specifying the committee's function and paying
members).
Cf. NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214-16 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding
that no employer domination existed when committee prepared own bylaws and
elected own members, and management representatives attended only at commit-
tee's invitation); Duquesne Univ., 198 N.L.R.B. 891, 892-93 (1972) (failing to find
domination when employees formed and structured organization, even though em-
ployer had potential to influence).
142. Lee, supra note 83, at 211.
143. See, e.g., Utrad Corp., 454 F.2d at 523 (relying on, inter alia, employer's
anti-union history and resurrection of employee committee contemporaneously with
organizing campaign in finding domination); Jet Spray Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 127, 140
(1984) (finding employer domination where employee committee was created by
president, who determined the committee composition, selection process, and meet-
ing dates, and who threatened reprisals if an outside union was selected); MGR
Equip. Corp., 272 N.L.R.B. 353, 359 (1984) (finding that employer actions to en-
courage employees to form own union on company time, while being paid and dur-
ing a union organizing campaign, constituted employer domination).
144. MCADAMS & HAWK, supra note 2, at 38 (finding consultants were used in
designing 46% of the PRPs studied).
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ment relations.145 The tests require the NLRB to show actual domi-
nation, rather than potential domination, to establish a violation.146
Cooperation, but not necessarily support, remains lawful.147 Mere
facilitation of the operations of a labor organization fails to establish
domination." Furthermore, an employer's support must actually
create company control over the organization in order to be an un-
fair labor practice. 49 Contextual factors taken into account include
145. See, e.g., Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 545 (describing test for domina-
tion as a "subjective one"); Streamway, 691 F.2d at 293 (stating that "the adversarial
model of labor relations is an anachronism" and rejecting a "rigid interpretation of
the statute"); Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1213-14 (finding subjective test appro-
priate); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating that
"almost any form of employer cooperation, however innocuous, could be deemed
'support' or 'interference.' Yet such a myopic view of § 8(a)(2) would undermine its
very purpose and the purpose of the Act as a whole.. ."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875
(1975).
See also NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968) (hold-
ing that a joining of hands between employers and union to exclude employees vio-
lated § 8(a)(1) and (2)); Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201,204 (6th Cir.
1967) (holding cooperation between and assistance to the employee committee by
the employer insufficient for domination); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d
564, 571 (1st Cir. 1957) (holding company president's suggestions that employees
form committee insufficient for domination).
146. Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204.
147. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968). See also
Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 167-70 (relying on employee satisfaction and em-
ployer's "laudable" motives which indicated that employer "cooperated" with,
rather than "supported," the committee). In Chicago Rawhide, the Seventh Circuit
also relied on the facts that employees originated the committee idea, the employer
minimally supported the committee, and the employer's limited involvement was
not in response to an outside union's organizing efforts. Id. at 167-68. The court
stated:
A line must be drawn ... between support and cooperation. Support, even
though innocent, can be identified because it constitutes at least some degree of
control or influence. Cooperation only assists the employees or their bargain-
ing representative in carrying out their independent intention. If this line be-
tween cooperation and support is not recognized, the employer's fear of
accusations of domination may defeat the principal purpose of the Act, which is
cooperation between management and labor.
Id. at 167.
148. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1214.
149. Classic Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205,208 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that
employer dominated an employee committee which was set up by employer after
learning of worker interest in establishing a union; employer also actively cam-
paigned against the union); Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204 (stating "evidence of a
weak labor organization alone, does not support an inference of company domina-
tion," and finding no exertion of "subtle and insidious control over ignorant or pro-
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evidence of anti-union bias, 5 ' extensive employer influence, 151 and
employee dissatisfaction 5' with the committee. 153 Evidence of em-
ployer intent'54 and employee free choice ls5 are also relevant. If
testing employees"). See also Coppus Eng'g, 240 F.2d at 571-72 (printing shop
committee's rules in employer's booklet of plant rules and policies insufficient for
domination); Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 168 (holding employer's cooperation
and assistance insufficient for domination).
150. Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that "for-
mation of committee in direct response to union campaign" is a factor in determin-
ing domination); Modem Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204 (holding that evidentiary lack of
anti-union animus pertinent to finding of no domination, despite employer assist-
ance to in-house representation plan).
151. Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 546 (considering management absence at
employee committee meetings indicative of lack of domination).
152. Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 547 (holding employee satisfaction is one
factor in determining employer assistance); Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 631
(considering fact that committee plan was suggested by employee offered proof of
employee satisfaction with cooperative efforts); Modem Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204
(holding that evidentiary lack of employee dissatisfaction pertinent to no finding of
domination, despite employer control of in-house representation plan, and coupled
with fact that outside union seeking to represent employees brought the charges).
Cf. Lawson Co., 753 F.2d at 478 (holding that employee dissatisfaction is not the
only factor in determining domination).
153. Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204. See also Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d
471 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the employer's anti-union animus was sufficient to
find employer domination).
154. See Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1215 (finding employee's suggestion of
implementing committee persuasive factor in not finding employer domination).
155. See Homemaker Shops, 724 F.2d at 546 (holding that employer assistance
with union balloting process did not subvert employees' free choice, thus no domina-
tion); Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1215 (finding that employer's potential power
to appoint committee members did not infer domination when power never exer-
cised); Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 634 (stating that "where cooperative ar-
rangement reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the organization is capable
of being a meaningful avenue for the expression of employee wishes, we find it un-
objectionable under the Act."); NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465, 471-74 (9th Cir.
1954) (holding employer preference for one union over another was not domination
as it did not impact employee free choice).
But see Newport News, 308 U.S. at 251 (holding that even though employees were
satisfied with joint employer-employee committee for twelve years, the NLRA re-
quires strict separation of management and labor; employee satisfaction is irrele-
vant). Several circuits have strictly followed Newport News. See, e.g., Local 1814,
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 1384, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding
that free choice analysis is irrelevant).
Many commentators advocate emphasizing employee free choice in evaluating
domination. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 77, at 546; Jackson, supra note 83, at 833-
39; New Standards, supra note 76, at 525 (stating "[s]ince employee freedom of
choice is an underlying goal of the Act, the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of employ-
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
286 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:255
the employer induces the employees to perceive that the committee
represents its interests, the practice is unfair.'5 6
The Supreme Court has not yet sanctioned the use of subjective
factors to evaluate domination. Early on, in fact, the Court dis-
avowed use of the employee satisfaction test in NLRB v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.157 The NLRB follows the
Supreme Court's objective factor approach.'5 8
A recent appellate case illustrates the subjective approach. In
Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB,'59 the Sixth Circuit relied heavily upon the
nature and impact of the employer's conduct to determine that an
employee committee was not an unfairly dominated labor organiza-
tion. For four years prior to the allegedly unlawful conduct, Air-
stream's management conducted "rap sessions" in which employees
asked questions and made suggestions. 60 A month after the union
filed its petition for certification, Airstream's president announced
the formation of a President's Advisory Council (PAC), with mem-
bers elected by fellow employees. This move formally institutional-
ized the rap sessions.' 6 ' The PAC held its first meeting only three
days prior to the union election. 62 The PAC met on company time,
during which the president distributed a written agenda explaining
the role of the committee and the discussion topics: the Attendance
Bonus Program, absentee policy, and work rules.' 63 The union sub-
sequently lost the election and charged, inter alia, that Airstream
unfairly dominated the PAC.'"
The NLRB Administrative Law Judge agreed with the union, but
ees should be a controlling factor"); Participatory Management, supra note 15, at
1749-58; William P. Schurgin, The Limits of Organized Employer-Employee Rela-
tions in Non-Union Facilities: Some New Evidence of Flexibility, 57 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 615, 636-41 (1981).
156. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968).
157. 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939) (holding that employer satisfaction is irrelevant);
accord NLRB v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 319 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1943).
158. See, e.g., Memphis Truck & Trailer, 284 N.L.R.B. at 912 (1987) (finding a
QC-type EPP initiated by the president, financially supported by company, and re-
quiring company approval to be unfairly dominated); see supra notes 130-43.
159. 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. at 1295.
161. Id. at 1293.
162. Id. at 1294.
163. Id. at 1295.
164. Airstream, 877 F.2d at 1292.
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the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the discussion of
the absentee policy at the PAC meeting did not constitute "dealing
with" employees regarding hours of employment or conditions of
work, let alone grievances, wages, or rates of pay.165 The court held
that the PAC functioned as a means of communication between
management and employees."6 As such, the committee fell within
Cabot Carbon's "matters of mutual interest" exception. 167 Further,
no substantial evidence of anti-union animus existed.168 Absent an
express finding that the committee constituted a labor organiza-
tion,169 the court held that the employer did not dominate the PAC
because the PAC's formation did not influence the election. 7 °
Most EPPs would survive a subjective factor analysis in the First,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. 171 Employee dissatisfaction is rarely re-
ported, and it is doubtful that employees' free choice to unionize is
curtailed. Only when the employer blatantly attempts to thwart
union organization would a plan run afoul of the NLRA under a
subjective factor analysis. 2
C. Recent NLRB Decisions Regarding Participation Plans
The NLRB continues to interpret the NLRA strictly. In Electro-
165. Id. at 1296-97.
166. Id. at 1296.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1297-98.
169. The court glossed over the subject matter test by stating that the absentee
policy did not fall under the "conditions of work" category. Airstream, 877 F.2d at
1297. The court completely ignored the structure test even though the employees
unequivocally elected representatives. Instead, it strenuously found that the com-
mittee constituted only a communications device rather than one that 'dealt with'
management under the functional test. Id.
170. Id. at 1297-98. The Board in Electromation criticized both the Airstream
and Streamway § 2(5) labor organization analyses as relying on indicia of employer
control, which is relevant only to the § 8(a)(2) domination issue. Electromation, 309
N.L.R.B. at 996. Airstream indeed appears to avoid the traditional labor organiza-
tion tests, and considers the employer's conduct and negligible impact on the union
election the most persuasive arguments for resolving the entire issue. Airstream, 877
F.2d at 1297-98.
171. See, e.g., Streamway, 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); Northeastern Univ., 601
F.2d 1208 (lst Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
172. The NLRB in Research Federal Credit Union, infra notes 187-94, even if it
had adopted subjective factor analysis, would nonetheless have found the EPP an
unfairly dominated labor organization due to the questionable motives of
management.
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mation, Inc., 7 3 the NLRB found that five joint employee-manage-
ment "action committees" were labor organizations. Management
formed the committees in a non-union plant to deal with deteriorat-
ing employee morale with respect to several issues, as reflected in
the committee names: Absenteeism/ Infractions, No-Smoking Pol-
icy, Communications Network, Pay Progression for Premium Posi-
tions, and Attendance Bonus Program.174 Each committee
consisted of six volunteer employees, one or two members of man-
agement, and the company's Employee Benefits Manager. 175 The
Board found that all of the committees discussed subject matters
included within section 2(5), that employees participated in a repre-
sentational capacity, and that they "dealt with" management by
making recommendations. 76 Management, however, was unaware
of a union organizing campaign when it formed the committees and
ceased attending them once the union demanded recognition. 177
The NLRB nonetheless concluded that the employer unfairly domi-
nated the committee by creating it, determining its structure and dis-
cussion subject matter, and supporting it such that the committee's
existence "rested with the [employer] and not with the employ-
ees."' 78 Further, the employer did not effectively disestablish the
committee, as evidenced by the meetings that continued after man-
agement withdrew.179
Member Raudabaugh's concurrence in Electromation recom-
mended an alternative test for domination. The analysis examined
four factors:
(1) the extent of the employer's involvement in the structure
and operation of the committees; (2) whether the employees,
from an objective standpoint, reasonably perceive the EPP as a
substitute for full collective bargaining through a traditional
union; (3) whether employees have been assured of their Sec-
tion 7 right to be represented by a traditional union under a
system of full collective bargaining, and (4) the employer's mo-
tives in establishing the EPP. 80
173. 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992).
174. Id. at 991.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 997.
177. Id. at 991.
178. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 998.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1013 (Raudabaugh, concurring).
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No single factor under Raudabaugh's proposal would be disposi-
tive. 81 As applied to the facts in Electromation, Raudabaugh con-
sidered the first factor to weigh heavily in favor of domination, as
management exercised complete control over the committee. 82
The second factor, employee perception, also indicated employer
domination because the committee members were viewed as repre-
sentatives, and thus a substitute for collective bargaining. 83 The
employer did not notify the employees of their section 7 rights, and
thus the third factor also weighed heavily toward domination.'8 4
There was insufficient evidence to find domination based solely on
the fourth factor. ' 85
In Raudabaugh's opinion, the first, second, and third factors
weighed heavily in favor of domination and more than offset the
employer's good motives.186 Under this analysis, the Electromation
management might have tipped the balance in its favor if only it had
reminded the employees of their right to unionize prior to the com-
mittees' formation; subsequent events proved, however, that the
employees did not require such prompting.
In Research Federal Credit Union,187 the employer contacted a
management consultant for advice on how to handle mounting em-
ployee discontent two months before a union demanded recogni-
tion, and hired the consultant one day after the demand.' 88 The
consultant interviewed employees and recommended an EPP to im-
prove morale. 189 The "Employee Involvement Committee," con-
sisting of three elected employees and three managers, met three
times prior to the unsuccessful union election and twice thereaf-
ter.1" The committee discussed various topics including the smok-
ing policy, performance evaluations, ventilation, pay raises, and sick
time.191 It made recommendations, some of which the credit
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1014-15.
183. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1015.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 15 (Jan. 8, 1993).
188. Id. at *8-9.
189. Id. at *13-23.
190. Id. at *28-29.
191. Id. at *30-35.
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union's board of directors adopted.' 92
The NLRB held the committee was a labor organization, relying
on the facts that the employer created and structured the commit-
tee; employees elected representatives to discuss wages, hours of
employment, and working conditions; the committee made recom-
mendations to management; and both the employer and consultant
displayed anti-union animus.' 93 The Board also found the employer
dominated the committee, basing its decision on management's cre-
ation and sustenance of the committee, and the suspicious proximity
of the union demand and the EPP introduction.1 94
Shortly after considering EPPs in the non-union environments of
Electromation and Research Federal Credit Union, the NLRB con-
sidered EPPs in the unionized setting of E.L du Pont de Nemours &
Co.'95 Over union objections, du Pont unilaterally established six
safety committees and one fitness committee.196 The committees
consisted of both volunteer employee and management members,
192. Research Federal Credit Union, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 15, at *30-35.
193. Id. at *35-36.
194. Id. at *36. Shortly after Research Federal Credit Union, the NLRB con-
fronted another § 2(5)-§ 8(a)(2) case containing evidence of anti-union animus. In
Salt Lake Div., A Div. of Waste Management of Utah, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. No. 149,
1993 NLRB LEXIS 306 (Mar. 29, 1993), a new divisional manager reduced the em-
ployees' vacation pay and replaced their sick-leave with an attendance bonus pro-
gram. Id. at *18. Employee morale, already low, sunk further. Id. Four months
later, two employees contacted a union representative and commenced organizing.
Id. Two months after the union requested an election, the manager formed the Ben-
efits, Safety, and Productivity & Routing Committees and asked employees to par-
ticipate. Id. at *36-37. The manager selected committee members from among the
employees that volunteered. Id. at *37. In the month preceding the election, the
manager met several times with each committee and announced a "proposed" safety
bonus program along with "proposed" revisions to the attendance bonus program
and vacation plan. Id. at *38-41. The manager informed the employees that the
latter two were scheduled for approval at the next committee meeting, coinciden-
tally the same day as the union election. Id. at *41-42. As the manager determined
the committee size and membership, set the meeting times and agenda, led the
meetings, and selected which employee proposals were meritorious, the ALl had
little difficulty finding that the committees constituted labor organizations domi-
nated "as part of a transparent attempt to undermine employee support of the
union." Id. at *44-45. The Board adopted the decision and order of the AU out-
right. Id. at *1-2.
195. 311 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637 (May 28, 1993).
196. Id. at *1. The committees met the § 2(5) subject matter test because they
discussed safety, incentive awards, and facility improvements. Id. at *3. At least
two of the committees agreed to award incentives in recognition of safe work prac-
tices. Id. at *8-9.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/8
ENHANCING EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY
and conducted business by consensus decision-making."9 The man-
agement members had veto power over any employee proposal. 9 '
Management members also set the agenda and conducted the meet-
ings.' 99 Employees had no influence over committee composition
or operation. 2° Management responded positively to committee
proposals, 20 1 some of which were similar to earlier union proposals
rejected by management. 2" Based on these facts, the NLRB
concluded that the committees constituted dominated labor
organizations.2 °3
Perhaps in response to criticism over its Electromation decision,
the NLRB took great pains in du Pont to emphasize the types of
employee participation which would not run afoul of the NLRA.
Brainstorming sessions in which ideas are developed or information
shared are safe havens as long as the session as a whole does not
operate as a bilateral mechanism to make recommendations or pro-
posals to management.' Employee suggestion boxes also remain
197. Id. at *7.
198. Id. at *10.
199. du Pont, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637, at *10.
200. Id. at *11.
201. Id. at *6.
202. Id. at *16.
203. Id. at *10-12. The Board counseled:
As a practical matter, if management representatives can reject employee pro-
posals, it makes no real difference whether they do so from inside or outside the
committee. In circumstances where management members of the committee
discuss proposals with employee members and have the power to reject any
proposal, we find that there is "dealing" within the meaning of Section 2(5)....
The mere presence, however, of management members on a committee would
not necessarily result in a finding that the committee deals with the employer
within the meaning of Section 2(5). For example, there would no "dealing
with" management if the committee were governed by majority decision-mak-
ing, management representatives were in the minority, and the committee had
the power to decide matters for itself, rather than simply make proposals to
management. Similarly, there would be no "dealing" if management represent-
atives participated on the committee as observers or facilitators without the
right to vote on committee proposals.
Id. at *7-8.
The Board rejected a subjective standard based on employee perception to evalu-
ate the functional test for a labor organization. Id. at *3 n.7.
204. du Pont, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637, at *15. The Board specifically found
that quarterly all-day safety conferences did not violate the NLRA. The Board did
hold that the conferences constituted "brainstorming" sessions, and violated
§ 8(a)(5) by bypassing the union in discussing the mandatory bargaining subject of
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immune from attack because individuals, not groups, use such meth-
ods to make proposals.20 5
The NLRB also articulated its position on PRPs in du Pont. All
of du Pont's safety committees discussed, proposed, and imple-
mented incentive awards for safety improvements.20 6 Earlier, the
union made similar proposals, but management rebuffed them.2 °7
The Board ruled that du Pont bypassed the union, violating the
mandatory bargaining provisions of section 8(a)(5),20 s in addition to
dominating the committees in violation of section 8(a)(2).20 9 The
Board ordered du Pont to cease and desist from operating its PRPs,
disestablish the committees, and rescind the awards.210
D. Practical Implications of the NLRB Decisions
In all three cases, the NLRB designated EPPs as unfairly domi-
nated labor organizations. The du Pont decision similarly branded
PRP committees. While du Pont provides management with practi-
cal guidance as to how to set up and maintain lawful communication
devices, these applications are severely limited and are unlikely to
provide the long-term productivity gains available under EPPs and
PRPs.
Further, Research Federal Credit Union clearly shows that the typ-
ically non-unionized service sector is not immune from the NLRA.
EPPs will not survive scrutiny under the NLRB's gauntlet of objec-
tive tests. As a practical matter, the employer can safely avoid dom-
inating a labor organization only if it avoids discussing work
conditions, involving employees, and having employees make rec-
ommendations. This is a problem for employers because these are
the crucial elements that make EPPs effective.
Pursuing productivity through PRPs is less problematic than EPPs
safety. Id. at *14-15. "Nothing in the Act prevents an employer from encouraging
its employees to express their ideas and to become more aware of safety problems in
their work." Id. at *15.
205. 1& at *5-6.
206. Id. at *31 (Devaney, concurring).
207. Id. at *16.
208. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). See also Sockell, supra note
15, at 543 (arguing that unionized employers may violate § 8(a)(5) by negotiating
with representatives other than those certified to represent employees).
209. du Pont, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637, at *16-17.
210. Id. at *17-20.
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because committees are not necessary. Although task force
designed PRPs produce better results,21' there is no statistical infer-
ence that task force committees must include employees to suc-
ceed.212 The prescription is clear: Employers wishing to implement
a PRP avoid potential unfair labor charges only if there are no em-
ployees placed on the design task force or involved in reassessment.
The NLRA allows anyone to file an unfair labor charge against an
employer on behalf of an employee.213 Thus, any agitated employee
could charge a non-unionized employer with dominating a labor or-
ganization should the employer institute an EPP or PRP with
employees serving on committees.214 The lack of a standing re-
quirement also means that foreign competitors not subject to the
NLRA could file unfair labor charges whenever their American ri-
vals establish employee committees. Otherwise legitimate and ben-
eficial EPPs and PRPs may fall by the wayside merely because of
the perceived threat of NLRA compliance.
Management, however, may not be overly concerned with charges
of dominating labor organizations because the remedies available to
successful challengers have a minimal impact on management.215
The NLRB does not assess financial penalties.21 6 Management may
211. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of PRP plans
designed by a task force.
212. See McADAMS & HAwK, supra note 2, at 38.
213. No section of the NLRA imposes a standing requirement in order to file an
unfair labor practice charge. The courts have never required standing. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1943) (stating "[d]ubious
character, evil or unlawful motives, or bad faith of the informer cannot deprive the
Board of its jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry"). Accord Hercules Powder Co. v.
NLRB, 297 F.2d 424,433 (5th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers
Local No. 364, 274 F.2d 19, 24 (7th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. General Shoe Corp., 192
F.2d 504, 505-07 (6th Cir. 1951); Steve Gunderson, NLRB Muddies Regulatory Wa-
ters, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1993, at A10 (stating "[a]nyone, whether a disgruntled
employee, an outside union, or a pesky competitor, may file a charge against [a]
committee with the NLRB.").
214. While this scenario is possible, there is little evidence that it in fact occurs.
Since 1990, § 8(a)(2) complaints averaged only 0.21% of the General Counsel's
caseload. du Pont, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637, at *24 n.4 (Devaney, concurring).
215. See supra note 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
remedies on management.
216. Pennsylvania Greyhound, 303 U.S. at 267-68. See also Dau-Schmidt, supra
note 32, at 506-09 (recommending financial penalties to better deter employer in-
transigence); supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing nonfinancial penal-
ties against employers who assist or dominate an employee group).
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decide that the benefits of increased productivity outweigh the costs
of compliance with the NLRA. Although the effects of a remedial
order may have few financial ramifications for the employer, nega-
tive public relations effects may loom. 2 17
IV. POLICY AND CHANGE
The evidence shows that EPPs and PRPs, depending on their de-
sign and the firm's organizational culture, enhance employee pro-
ductivity.218  Increased productivity benefits employees,
management, and the federal government. 219 But the legal frame-
work designed to empower industrial employees under the NLRA
poses problems for service sector employers pursuing such plans in
non-union environments.220 Unless the framework is changed, the
actors may be forced to forego the opportunities for improvement
that EPPs and PRPs offer.
The overriding policy question is thus whether the interests of em-
ployees, management, and the government can be collectively
aligned and individually protected to promote increased productiv-
ity.221 In other words, "[s]hould we allow a legal framework tai-
lored to exigencies of the past rather than the necessities of the
future to obstruct the development of full commitment and coopera-
tion, which are necessary ingredients for America to regain its com-
petitive edge in the global economy? 222
217. Gunderson, supra note 213, at A10 (noting unfair labor practice charges
"may raise difficult public relations problems, likely tarnishing your company's im-
age with labor groups, suppliers, the surrounding community and others").
218. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effec-
tiveness of EPPs and PRPs.
219. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pro-
ductivity crisis.
220. See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practi-
cal implications of the recent NLRB holdings.
221. Freeman stated:
Research has not yet adequately addressed or answered the $64,000 question:
how can firms and unions develop the good employer-worker relations that
maximize productivity and thus benefit workers, employers, and the public?
Even partial answers to this question would have a tremendous practical payoff.
Freeman, supra note 32, at 157.
222. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 15, at 22.
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A. Policy Considerations
The inherent problem in solving this dilemma is that neither the
adversarial model, as embodied in the NLRA, nor cooperative mod-
els, such as EPPs and PRPs, easily accommodate each other. These
bipolar extremes fail to recognize that employers' and employees'
interests both conflict and coalesce.=
A primary concern among employees is fair treatment on the job.
Job security is another employee concern. 4 Unions exist to assure
democracy in the workplace; this includes protecting economic in-
terests of employees, providing due process, and improving morale
and the physical work environment.225
223. Clarke noted that "[gjiven the diametrically opposite nature of these two
models, the Act cannot simultaneously encourage one while remaining neutral be-
tween the two. Because it explicitly endorses collective bargaining, the Act cannot
support a neutral section 8(a)(2) analysis that turns on a determination of 'employee
free choice."' Clarke, supra note 67, at 2033 (emphasis omitted).
Another commentator argued:
[I]t is the handling of conflict, not unions, which affects productivity. Managers
and employees have shared interests, but also legitimate differences in interests.
It is these differences which underlie conflict in the workplace. The institutions
and procedures for managing conflict that govern employee and managerial be-
havior thereby regulate firm performance. Low trust/high conflict environ-
ments, environments with elevated levels of grievance activity, work stoppages,
and dissatisfaction are not conducive to employees doing more than is required
to earn a paycheck and avoid dismissal. Employers, lacking the support of their
labor force, cannot avail themselves of employee loyalty and intelligence to im-
prove the product or production methods. Conversely, high trust/low strife en-
vironments provide a foundation for improving efficiency. By developing trust,
emphasizing problem-solving, and respecting the divergent and conflicting in-
terests of the parties, these joint programs make it possible to implement new
technologies, job practices, employment relations, and management structures
in a manner consistent with the concerns of both labor and management.
Belman, supra note 7, at 70-71.
224. In comparing the U.S. and German labor systems, Schlossberg and Rein-
hart noted:
Nobody will argue the fact that U.S. employers have a unique proclivity to re-
spond to bad business news through the technique of employee layoffs - a
proclivity which is not only costly and self-defeating but which also aggravates
and hinders the whole economy.
Schlossberg & Reinhart, supra note 6, at 619. See also KATHARINE G. ABRAHAM &
SUSAN N. HOUSEMAN, JOB SECURITY IN AMERICA: LESSONS FROM GERMANY
(1993) (describing the German industrial relations model and recommending more
stringent job security provisions in American labor law).
225. Belman, supra note 7, at 72.
Labor, however, initially eschewed EPPs despite the potential for job enrichment
and higher wages. Labor viewed "employee involvement initiatives as veiled at-
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
296 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 45:255
Employers want to enhance productivity to increase profitability,
and perceive unions as an obstacle to this goal. Scholars disagree as
to whether unions positively effect productivity,22 6 but there is virtu-
ally unanimous scholarly consensus that unions negatively affect
tempts by management to increase control, link jobs to profitability and undermine
their existence." Samborn, supra note 9, at 1. Eaton and Voos found that:
This association of innovation, particularly employee participation with nonun-
ion companies and facilities, initially created a climate of hostility and suspicion
within the labor movement. While opposition continues in some cases today, in
general union leaders have become much more diversified in their views and
less oppositional in the 1980s.
Eaton & Voos, supra note 1, at 181 (citation omitted).
Alternatively, EPPs might constitute a ruse to undermine collective bargaining
and increase production speeds. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, The Abil-
ity of Unions to Adapt to Innovate Workplace Arrangements, 79 AM. ECON. REv.
172-76 (1989). Furthermore, EPPs could potentially restrict employees' freedom of
association by forcing them to participate on committees. Furfaro & Josephson,
supra note 9, at 3. See generally GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS:
QUALITY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1988) (detailing
the QC experience at a Johnson & Johnson plant as an anti-union tactic).
226. See HIRscH & ADDISON, supra note 32, at 100-01. Hirsch and Addison
found no "compelling evidence" that unions effect productivity positively or nega-
tively, but suggested that there are positive effects in industries with large wage dif-
ferentials between union and non-union workers, and when competitive pressures
are present. Further, Hirsch and Addison noted that unions extract wage increases
from management to the detriment of physical capital and research and develop-
ment budgets, thereby suppressing productivity gains. Hirsch and Addison also
argued:
As a consequence, productivity growth tends to be slower in unionized firms
and industries. Increased management opposition to unions, and declining
union coverage and employment within most sectors of the U.S. economy, ap-
pear to be predictable responses to the relatively poor performance of highly
unionized companies during the 1970s.
Id.
But see Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, Trade Unions in the Production Pro-
cess, 86 J. POL. ECON. 355, 377 (1978) (arguing union productivity is higher than
non-union establishments); Kim B. Clark, The Impact of Unionization on Productiv-
ity: A Case Study, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 451, 467-68 (1980) (examining ce-
ment plants prior to and after unionization, and finding a positive union effect on
productivity of 6-8%). Brown and Medoff found positive union-productivity effects,
and while plausible that unionization possibly makes workers more productive, they
dismissed the alternate theory that the causal linkage may be obscured in that un-
ions tend to target organizational efforts toward the most productive firms within an
industry. Id. at 373-74. Brown and Medoff concluded that for U.S. manufacturing
firms, "[u]nion and nonunion establishments... can compete in the same product
market despite the fact that the former pay their workers more because unionized
workers.., are more productive by a roughly offsetting amount." Id. at 377.
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firm profits.227
Taken together, the interests of employees and employers can be
viewed as converging more than conflicting. The interests are de-
pendent: each requires the other in order to pursue their economic
interests. Employee concerns are not merely economic. Indeed, the
underlying theory of EPPs and PRPs is that alleviating employees'
concerns about job security, due process, and quality of work life
make them more productive. The flood of EPP introductions may
be positive proof that management now realizes it is self-serving to
address employee concerns.
Conflicts still remain, however, over economic concerns, particu-
larly compensation. Management, holding the purse strings, stands
to benefit more economically from productivity gains than employ-
ees. The distribution of productivity gains between the employer
and employee invites confrontation.2" PRPs potentially redress
this inequality. If employees participate in designing PRP gainshar-
ing and in setting baselines, and if management agrees to an equita-
ble split of productivity gains, both parties win.22 9
Government interests include encouraging productivity and
227. See supra note 32. Others argue that an employer may well want to en-
courage unionism despite studies showing a negative impact on profitability. The
MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity concluded that business leaders should:
support diffusion of cooperative industrial relations systems by accepting labor
representatives as legitimate and valued partners in the innovative process.
American managers must recognize that unions are a valued institution in any
democratic society. Resources traditionally devoted to avoiding unionization
need to be reallocated toward promoting and sustaining union-management
cooperation.
MICHAEL C. DERTOUZOS ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE PRODUC-
TIVE EDGE 150 (1989).
228. Zurofsky, supra note 6, at 385-86. Zurofsky argued:
An employer-imposed committee is inherently unequal. What the boss giveth,
the boss can taketh away. There is no vehicle for effectively demanding or se-
curing any supposed employee gains. Without real equality and real bargaining,
employer-imposed employee participation committees are a sham in terms of
advancing employee interests.. .. The only thing lacking from this collectively
bargained ideal is representation of the employee's interest. Where is the right
of the employee to demand increased compensation for becoming "his or her
own best manager"? Is the virtue of service to the corporate ideal to be its own
reward?
Id.
229. See generally BRIAN GRAHAM-MOORE & TIMOTHY L. Ross, GAINSHAR-
ING: PLANS FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE (1990) (discussing the benefits of joint
employee-management participation in PRP gainsharing design).
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resolving conflict efficiently. But various government entities send
mixed messages. The Department of Labor and the administrative
commissions speak glowingly of employee-employer cooperation,2 30
while the NLRB virtually forbids it. 1 Such a schizophrenic ap-
proach to labor policy serves no party's best interests. 32
The optimal solution requires, first and foremost, a consistent
governmental policy. If we assume cooperation is preferred to con-
frontation, policy should encourage cooperation whenever possible.
EPPs and PRPs should be legal. Only when cooperation fails and
adversarial conditions arise should an adversarial model, held in re-
serve, come into play.
In this vein, employees should have the right to union representa-
tion, but also the right to decline representation.3 3 Similarly, em-
ployees should have the right not to participate in EPPs. 34
Conversely, when employees freely and deliberately choose to be
non-union, management should be able to form EPPs and PRPs
without running afoul of the NLRA.
Unfortunately, the only clear indication that employees have ex-
ercised their free choice to be non-union is a negative vote by the
230. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of various com-
missions and recommendations regarding labor-management cooperation.
231. See supra notes 80-217 and accompanying text for discussion of case law
which prohibits labor-management cooperation.
232. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of NLRB v.
Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959), in which the federal government en-
couraged the employer to form the committees in question, well after Congress en-
acted the NLRA. The Supreme Court, of course, found the committees to be
unfairly dominated labor organizations. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. at 214-15.
233. Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees individuals the right "to refrain from any
or all [labor organization] activities." NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 7
does not, however, guarantee individuals the right to bargain individually. For in-
stance, if the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit vote for union repre-
sentation, the minority will be represented by the union and bound by the union's
collective bargaining agreement even if they do not join.
One commentator stated:
Workers should be given the choice between adversarial and cooperative repre-
sentation. Specifically, section 8(a)(2) should either be repealed, or amended to
clarify that it prohibits management coercion or domination, but that it does not
prohibit truly cooperative representation or worker participation plans. En-
forcement of the prohibition on coercive or employer-dominated plans should
be handled by the courts on a case-by-case basis.
Clarke, supra note 67, at 2040.
234. See Zurofsky, supra note 6, at 385 (arguing that employees must retain the
choice of not participating in EPPs).
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majority in a union election. What is not clear is whether employees
have exercised free choice by refusing to sign authorization cards,
thus preventing the election which would definitively signal their
choice. This scenario typifies the service sector, where unionization
attempts are relatively unsuccessful. How is non-unionized, service-
sector management to know when its employees have decided
against union representation, thus allowing it to introduce an EPP
or PRP which will benefit employees and the employer?
B. Alternatives for Change
The simplest solution would be for the NLRB and the courts to
apply a subjective factor analysis to the domination inquiry.3 5 This
is unlikely, as the Supreme Court and NLRB repeatedly resist fash-
ioning contemporary interpretations of the NLRA. 6 Since courts
cite congressional intent as the obstacle, the agent for change be-
comes Congress.3 7
The NLRB decisions to date regarding EPPs indicate that the
problem lies with section 2(5)'s overly broad inclusion of EPPs and
PRPs as labor organizations. Congress could alter the NLRA to ac-
commodate EPPs without eviscerating employee protections of sec-
tion 8(a)(2). Every EPP becomes a "labor organization" when
employee committees discuss the "conditions of work" pertinent to
improving productivity with the employer. Simply removing "issues
of quality, productivity and efficiency" 8 from the ambit of "condi-
tions of work" would rectify the immediate problem3 9 Most EPPS
and PRPs would escape "labor organization" status entirely because
235. Brody suggested that Congress not revise the NLRA because courts can
easily accommodate legitimate EPPs by adopting employee free-choice criteria and
new legislative provisions may cause more confusion than those presently in force.
Brody, supra note 77, at 573-75. Absent a definitive Supreme Court ruling incorpo-
rating employee free-choice analysis, however, the NLRB and appellate cases would
unlikely converge.
236. du Pont, 1993 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 637, at *2 n.6 ("The Board does not have
the power to rewrite the 1935 National Labor Relations Act."); Electromation, 309
N.L.R.B. at 992.
237. Clarke, supra note 67, at 2039-41.
238. Id. at 2040-41.
239. A revised § 2(5) might define a "labor organization" as:
[A]ny organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation com-
mittee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose,
in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or any conditions of work
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they would not pass the subject matter test.240 Unfortunately, other
NLRA provisions rely on section 2(5)'s definition of "labor organi-
zation" to preclude unfair labor union practices. 41 Fixing one prob-
lem would create others.
Congress could alternatively modify section 8(a)(2) to prohibit
domination, but not prohibit assistance or support. This would elim-
inate the most egregious effects of management influence on em-
ployees. One author argued that if Congress repealed section
8(a)(2), section 8(a)(1) would continue to prohibit employer domi-
nation. 2 This author further suggested that enforcement of the
prohibition would necessarily require courts to deal with domina-
tion on a case-by-case basis. 43 Employers and the courts, however,
need more definitive guidance to avoid overloading judicial dockets.
Other solutions have been proffered. House legislators intro-
duced, but did not pass, the American Competitiveness Act24, in
1991, partially in anticipation of a pro-union Electromation decision.
The Act's sponsors intended to send a clear message to the NLRB
that not all EPPs are labor organizations unfairly dominated by em-
ployers. This bill simply carved out an exception to section 8(a)(2)
for two types of EPPS: quality circles and joint production teams.
Unfortunately, this bill failed to define exactly what constitutes a
quality circle or joint production team. Furthermore, it excluded
other than issues of product or service quality, workplace productivity and
efficiency.
240. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the subject
matter test.
241. See, e.g., NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1988) (specifying unfair labor
practices on the part of unions).
242. Clarke, supra note 67, at 2040-41. "Labor and management will be free to
cooperate, but oppressive employers will not be able to dominate." Id. at 2041.
243. Id. at 2040.
244. H.R. 2523, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Act provided:
Title III - Labor Provisions Sec. 301. Formation and Use of Quality Circles
and Joint Production Teams.
(a) In General.- Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (29
U.S.C. 158(a)(2)) is amended by inserting before the semicolon at the end the
following: "Provided further, That nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit the
formation or operation of quality circles or joint production teams composed of
labor and management, with or without the participation of representatives of
labor organizations" ...
Id.
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other types of EPPs and PRPs, particularly gainsharing, which have
the greatest potential for increasing productivity.
Congress' most recent proposal to amend the NLRA, the Team-
work for Employees and Management Act of 1993 (TEAM),245 is
laudable. It appends a proviso to section 8(a)(2) allowing employ-
ees to participate in organizations which discuss "matters of mutual
interest" and which clearly do not "have, claim or seek" the author-
ity to enter into collective bargaining agreements. 246 TEAM gener-
ically approves EPPs and PRPs by removing them from domination
status, and forthrightly relies on employees to be self-informed of
their section 7 collective bargaining rights.
Admittedly, this solution does not guarantee immunity for PRP
design teams. Compensation issues would still remain mandatory
bargaining topics. However, employee involvement in PRP design
derives no compelling productivity benefits.247 Thus, firms would
not risk violating the NLRA as long as employees do not sit on com-
mittees as employee representatives.
V. CONCLUSION
Managers have limited options in enhancing employee productiv-
ity after Electromation and du Pont. For the non-union manager,
Electromation and Research Federal Credit Union teach that EPPs
should only be pursued if employee morale is sufficiently high so as
not to invite union activity. Although there is no guarantee that
unfair labor practice charges will not be filed, absence of union ac-
tivity renders such charges less likely. The simple solution for man-
agers implementing PRPs is to mandate them without employee
245. S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The House bill, H.R. 1529, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993), is identical.
246. Section 3 of the bill provides:
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2)) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Provided further, That it
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this para-
graph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain or participate in any organi-
zation or entity of any kind, in which employees participate to discuss matters
of mutual interest (including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency) and
which does not have, claim or seek authority to neg-' iate or enter into collec-
tive bargaining agreements under this Act with the employer or to amend ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor
organization."
S. 669, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993).
247. McADAMS & HAwK, supra note 2, at 38.
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discussion and hope that employees will be duly motivated and ap-
preciative of the potential rewards. Under no circumstances should
employees be allowed to believe that they are gaining the benefits of
collective bargaining from an EPP or PRP committee. For the man-
ager of a unionized business, du Pont makes bargaining with the
union over the EPP and PRP imperative. Brainstorming sessions
and suggestions boxes, however, fall into the "safe haven"
category.248
As the twenty-first century approaches, the NLRA represents an
antiquated approach to labor relations. Mitigating industrial strife
was the reason for passing the Wagner Act in 1935; enhancing em-
ployee productivity in a service-based economy in order to compete
globally is now required. The NLRA should be revised in order to
address contemporary labor conditions. TEAM represents a sensi-
ble step in this direction. In the interest of productivity gains which
benefit all parties, the NLRA should be revised to shield EPPs and
PRIs from dominated labor organization status.
John S. Lapham*
248. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of brain-
storming sessions and suggestion boxes.
* J.D./M.B.A. 1994, Washington University.
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